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INTRODUCTION
One of the more elusive concepts in copyright law is that of
"authorship." Authorship refers to the production of "original"
works, meaning works which the author has newly created, as
opposed to copied from other sources, and which possess at least
some minimal degree of creativity.' Copyright protects "original
works of authorship"2 and extends only to what is original in such
works.3 Fixing the boundary between private property and the
public domain,4 the authorship/originality requirement has been
described by the Supreme Court as "the very 'premise of copyright
law"'5-the "touchstone,"6 "bedrock principle,"7 and "sine qua non"
of copyright.'
Metaphors like "bedrock" suggest a concept of authorship that is
immutable, sharply defined, and reassuringly solid. Authorship,
however, is so often characterized by what it is not that it is
sometimes difficult to say, positively, what authorship is. Consider
a scholar who prepares a new English-language translation of the
Iliad, with notes and an introduction based on the scholar's
historical research. The scholar can claim no right to the original
work, or to any aspect of the translation that accuracy compels.9 Nor
1. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression....").
3. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 ("The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that
every element of the work may be protected.... [C]opyright protection may extend only to those
components of a work that are original to the author.").
4. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1000 (1990) ("What we
rely on in place of physical borders, to divide the privately-owned from the commons and to
draw lines among the various parcels in private ownership, is copyright law's concept of
originality.").
5. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368
(5th Cir. 1981)).
6. Id. at 347.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 345.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply an exclusive right in the
preexisting material."). "Derivative work" means "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation ... or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
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can the scholar prevent others from reciting the facts revealed by
his research. The facts may be original in the sense of having
appeared nowhere else, but they were not created by the scholar;
they were discovered by him or, in a sense, "copied from the world.""°
Even choices reflecting matters of taste (e.g., this poetic turn of
phrase instead of that pedestrian one) are influenced, if not
determined, by a variety of external factors: the books the scholar
has read, the lectures he has attended, perhaps even the genes he
has inherited. Examined too closely, the process of authorship can
seem less a conscious and creative act than a mechanical confluence
of forces. It can be difficult to locate the "maker"1 who wills into
existence that which is personal and new.' 2
On the other hand, the complexity of the Iliad and the richness
of the English language mean that countless translations could be
written. The facts revealed by the scholar's research could be
expressed in a variety of ways. While the variations that mark the
scholar's work may be determined by his chromosomes or his
experience, his nature or nurture, they are still his variations. Like
most copyrightable works, whether they are artistic creations,
literary works, musical compositions, or some other form of
expression, the scholar's translation of the Iliad bears characteristic
attributes of authorship: the work is unique; 3 it owes its existence
to the scholar; it is the product of the scholar's intellectual labor; its
form reflects the author's intentions and conveys his message; and
or adapted." Id. § 101.
10. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. As the Court stated in Feist:
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular
fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence....
Census takers, for example, do not "create" the population figures that emerge
from their efforts; in a sense, they copy these figures from the world around
them.
Id.
11. Id. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
12. See MARK RoSE, AuTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 127 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1993) (relating questions of authorship to the problem of personal identity
spawned in the writings of John Locke and David Hume).
13. Courts have long held, however, that works may be "original" even if they are
indistinguishable from prior works, so long as they were not copied from those prior works
and the similarity is mere coincidence. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
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it reflects the scholar's individuality-his personality, his experi-
ences, his "self."
Yet consider the following hypotheticals, moving now from the
field of scholarly translation to that of abstract painting, where
unfettered originality would seem most feasible.
* Artist A notices a pleasing pattern on the floor of a hardware
store, where countless people have carelessly dripped paint.
Artist A purchases that section of the floor and hangs it in her
studio.
* Artist B tosses paint buckets in the air and lets the paint fall
where it may.
e Artist C paints a canvas with painstaking care, but the
position and color of each drop of paint is determined by rolling
a pair of dice.
* Artist D paints spontaneously, with little conscious thought,
her brush guided by the inspiration of her subconscious mind.14
Except perhaps in the case of Artist A, the works are not copied,
either from prior works or from the world. Each work is, in that
sense, original. Each artist, again with the possible exception of
Artist A, is physically involved in the creation of the work and is,
therefore, a "maker." Yet each work is to a substantial degree
indeterminate-that is, it is formed by agencies other than the
artist's conscious will. One could argue that Artist A is not the
author of her work, any more than if she had acquired the work of
another artist and claimed it as her own. In the terminology of Feist,
she did not create the work, she discovered it.'5 However, if that is
true of Artist A, the same might be said of the remaining artists,
who, in different ways, discovered their works as they were created.
Are any of these artists authors of their works, and can they claim
the intellectual property rights to which authors are entitled?
Although indeterminacy is an element in many conventional
works of authorship,'6 works dominated by random processes are
comparatively exotic creatures, inhabiting the realm of what David
14. For further discussion of these hypotheticals, see infra Part IV.A.
15. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
16. See infra notes 158-224 and accompanying text.
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Nimmer calls "extreme copyright." 7 They are useful, nevertheless,
because they focus one's attention on some fundamental questions
about the nature of authorship and the function of copyright. Wholly
indeterminate works have been held uncopyrightable because
some cognitive component essential to an original work of author-
ship is missing: mental effort, intention, personality, or meaning.' 8
In the discussion that follows, I will challenge that conclusion, or at
least demonstrate its potential inconsistency with some broader
principles of copyright doctrine. It is easy to say that works lacking
that cognitive element are not works of authorship; it is surprisingly
difficult to say why not. In fact, with only some facetiousness, one
could argue that indeterminate works are authorship's purest
expression--evidence that the deeper one digs, the more elusive the
conceptual "bedrock" proves to be.
In Part I, I examine authorship and originality as the courts have
defined them, including those instances where the subject of
indeterminacy has been specifically addressed. With one notable
exception, 9 courts have generally viewed indeterminacy and author-
ship as incompatible. In Part II, I discuss the use of indeterminate
processes in the arts, concentrating on the works of Jean Arp,
Marcel Duchamp, and John Cage. Through their experiments
with the processes of creation, these highly "original""0 artists defied
conventional expectations of authorship, while giving us some
clues to the possible aesthetic function of indeterminacy. Part III
examines, in abbreviated fashion, the theoretical foundations of
copyright and intellectual property in general. I specifically discuss
the natural rights and public benefits justifications for copyright
and their relationship to the concepts of authorship and originality.
In Part IV, I make the case for defining authorship in a way that
includes, with significant caveats, at least some indeterminate
works.
Issues of authorship have been much discussed in recent times,
perhaps because of a sense of uncertainty as to the direction
17. David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38
Hous. L. REV. 1, 14 (2001).
18. See infra Part I.D.
19. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 101-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
20. "Original" in the nonlegal sense of "startling, novel or unusual, a marked departure
from the past." Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102 (contrasting that definition of "original" with the
definition used for purposes of copyright).
574 [Vol. 44:569
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intellectual property law is taking us. I share the view of many
academics that expanding property rights encroaches too much on
the public domain.21 I am therefore hesitant, in some respects, to tug
at the foundations of copyright, for fear that another wall could
tumble and even more things become "propertized." At the same
time, I believe that intellectual property law deserves as sound and
consistent a theoretical basis as we can supply. We need to ask
provocative questions, if only to confirm that we really understand
what we think we understand. If nothing else, indeterminacy is a
fertile source of provocative questions.
I. "AUTHORSHIP" AND "ORIGINALITY"
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
empowers Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science ... by
securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to
their ... Writings .. Although "science" now refers to the fruits
of the scientific method, in the late-eighteenth century it
referred to knowledge or learning in general.23 The same clause
permits Congress "[to promote the Progress of ... useful Arts" by
granting "inventors," for limited times, exclusive rights to their
"discoveries."24 "[Ulseful arts" might be described today as
"technology."" The language referring to authors and writings is the
foundation of copyright law, as the language referring to inventors
and discoveries is the foundation of patent law.26
The Framers of the Constitution disfavored monopolies, 7 so the
provision for "exclusive rights" is a limited one. Not only must those
21. See Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality
Standard of Copyright, 33 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 791, 794 n.20 (2001).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1949) ("The word 'science,' which comes from the
Latin, scire, 'to know,' at the writing of the Constitution meant learning in general."). Because
copyright embraces fanciful as well as instructive works, the "science" promoted by copyright
includes artistic expression. If the intellectual property clause of the Constitution were
redrafted today, the words "knowledge and culture" might substitute for "science."
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. See Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419,
1437-44.
26. Id. at 1426.
27. See id. at 1455 n.185 (citing In re Shoa Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377,380 (C.C.P.A. 1951)).
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rights expire, enduring only for "limited times," they are confined
to certain people (authors and inventors) for certain kinds of
achievements (writings and discoveries) for an explicitly articulated
goal (to "promote the progress" of knowledge and technology). The
parallel threads that weave through the constitutional language,
one referring to the writings of authors and the other to the
discoveries of inventors,' establish a copyright/patent dichotomy
useful for understanding the limits of either. Whatever an "author"
may be, it must be something different than an "inventor" or the
Constitution would refer to them collectively. By the same
reasoning, a "writing" must be something other than a "discovery."29
On the other hand, copyright law has never confined "author" and
"writing" to their narrowest senses. The earliest copyright statutes
included maps and charts as copyrightable subject matter.0 As
the copyright statutes have been revised, the list of explicitly
recognized categories of copyrightable material has expanded. Today
those categories include literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
sound recordings, and architectural works.31 Although they are not
listed explicitly, computer programs have been recognized as a form
of literary work subject to copyright.32
The Copyright Act of 1909 mirrored the constitutional language
in its definition of copyrightable subject matter, referring to the
28. The clause provides, in its entirety, that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is an example of an eighteenth-century literary device known as a
"balanced sentence," which treats subjects in parallel to emphasize "related but distinct
terms." Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts (pt. 2), 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
487, 491-92 (1952); see EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEm, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL
ARTS: AMERIcAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 60-61 (1998).
29. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,100 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[Tlhe
very language of the Constitution differentiates (a) 'authors' and their 'writings' from (b)
'inventors' and their 'discoveries.').
30. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) ("These statutes
certainly answer the objection that books only, or writing in the limited sense of a book and
its author, are within the constitutional provision.").
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). These categories are nonexclusive. See Natl Basketball Ass'n
v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
32. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-49
(3d Cir. 1983).
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"writings of an author."3 3 The 1976 Copyright Act, which is still
used in modified form today, employs more specific language, '
stating that "[clopyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "s Yet
even before the Copyright Act referred to "original works," courts
identified originality as an essential component of authorship.
A. Works of Genius
Three Supreme Court cases-the Trade-Mark Cases,3" Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,"7 and Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co. 3 -lay the foundation for much of our subsequent
understanding of "authorship" and "originality."
In the Trademark Cases, the Court held existing federal
trademark laws unconstitutional because they were supported
neither by Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce nor by
Article I, Section 8.3' The Court's discussion of the latter might be
considered dicta, at least insofar as it concerns copyright or patent
law, but courts have cited it with approval in subsequent cases
specifically dealing with questions of authorship.' Trademark
rights are established by the use of a mark and the subsequent
identification of the mark with a particular source of goods. Such
rights may, therefore, be obtained in words or symbols that existed
prior to their adoption by the trademark owner."' A trademark, the
Court held, cannot be classified as the "writing of an author"
because it lacks, or may lack, the essential quality of "originality."2
33. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)).
34. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
36. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
37. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
38. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
39. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94-99.
40. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 346; Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir.
2001); Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1997).
41. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 ("At common law the exclusive right to it
grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.").
42. Id.
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[Wihile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has
been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is
only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers
of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits
of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints,
engravings and the like. The trade-mark may be, and generally
is, the adoption of something already in existence as the
distinctive symbol of the party using it.
4s
Significantly, the passage suggests that a "writing" must be more
than something new; it must be the product of intellectual effort or,
perhaps, of the author's imagination-the "creative powers of the
mind." However ingenious a trademark may be, rights to that mark
do not depend upon such ingenuity. The right to a trademark does
not require "novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain.
It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.
It is simply founded on priority of appropriation."" By implication,
a copyright does depend on some "work of the brain," though the
Court did not specify the form that work must take-imagination,
genius, laborious thought, or all of them combined.
Five years later, the Supreme Court returned to the subject of
originality in Burrow-Giles."' The work in dispute was a photograph
of Oscar Wilde, showing him posed in a chair with a book on his
knee.46 The defendant argued that a photograph is beyond the
subject matter of copyright because "being a reproduction on paper
of the exact features of some natural object or of some person, [it]
is not a writing of which the producer is the author."47 Unlike a
painting or print, which "embod[ies] the intellectual conception
of its author," a photograph, the defendant claimed, is a "mere
mechanical reproduction" of the scene, involving "no originality of
thought or any novelty in the intellectual operation connected with
its visible reproduction in the shape of a picture."4" That, the
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
46. Napolean Sarony, Oscar Wilde, No. 18 (1882).
47. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56.
48. Id. at 58-59. The defendant's argument, as summarized by the Court, continued:
[Wihile the effect of light on the prepared plate may have been a discovery in the
production of these pictures, and patents could properly be obtained for the
combination of the chemicals, for their application to the paper or other surface,
578 [Vol. 44:569
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defendant argued, deprived a photograph of the "authorship"
necessary to a copyrightable work.
The Court did not adopt, nor did the defendant advocate,
definitions of "author" or "writing" that would have excluded
pictorial works in general. The first copyright statutes dispelled the
notion that "books only, or writing in the limited sense of a book and
its author, are within the constitutional provision.""' The Court
defined "author" in a broader sense, as "he to whom anything owes
its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or
literature." ° Engravings, etchings, and other pictorial works qualify
as "writings" because they are "literary productions," a term which
includes "all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, & c., by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression."5' As to photographs, the Court "entertain[ed] no doubt
that the Constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing
copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of
original intellectual conceptions of the author." 2
The Court rejected the argument that a photograph is merely
the mechanical reproduction of a scene, divorced from any exercise
of the photographer's intellect.53 The photograph of Oscar Wilde
was "'made ... entirely from [the photographer's] own original
mental conception,'" given form by choosing the costume and
background, posing the subject, "'evoking the desired expression,'
and "'arranging and disposing the light and shade."54 The resulting
photograph, a 'useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and grace-
for all the machinery by which the light reflected from the object was thrown on
the prepared plate, and for all the improvements in this machinery, and in the
materials, the remainder of the process is merely mechanical, with no place for
novelty, invention or originality. It is simply the manual operation, by the use
of these instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the visible
representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this representation being
its highest merit.
Id. at 59.
49. Id. at 57.
50. Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 59-60.
54. Id. at 60 (quoting findings of fact).
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ful picture,"' constituted an "original work of art, the product of
plaintiffs intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author.... "56
Burrow-Giles contains material for differing conceptions of
"authorship." The "more enlarged definition" to which the Court
found the term "author" susceptible is "'he to whom anything owes
its origin; originator; maker... ." That definition could be satisfied
by "makers" with no intellectual investment in what they
make-hikers whose boots leave footprints, for example. The consti-
tutional pairing of "authors" with "writings," however, suggests that
only certain forms of expressive material qualify for copyright.58
Elsewhere, the Court contrasts the ease with which copyrights can
be obtained, as contrasted with patents, which are rigorously
examined in the application process. Because of the disparity, "[ilt
is ... much more important that ... the existence of those facts of
originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception on
the part of the author should be proved, than in the case of a patent
right."59 From this language, it appears that an "author" is not only
a maker, but a thinker.'
55. Id. (quoting findings of fact). As to whether an "ordinary ... photograph" embodied
similar qualities of authorship, the Court reserved judgment. Id. at 59.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Id. at 57-58 (citation omitted); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work,
that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to
copyright protection.").
58. See Burrow.Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 ("By writings in that clause is meant the literary
productions of those authors, and Congress very properly has declared these to include all
forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the mind of the
author are given visible expression.") (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). As the Court specifically stated:
Nor is it to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution did not understand
the nature of copyright and the objects to which it was commonly applied, for
copyright, as the exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius or
intellect, existed in England at that time ....
Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
60. See Nat'l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1902). The
Seventh Circuit held
that a mere "annal of events transpiring" is not copyrightable because,
[glenerally speaking, authorship implies that there has been put into the
production something meritorious from the author's own mind; that the product
embodies the thought of the author ... and would not have found existence in the
form presented, but for the distinctive individuality of the mind from which it
sprang.
Id.; see also Oxford Univ. Press, N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 33 C.C.P.A. 11, 19 (1945)
580
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One could even conclude that "authorship" requires the level of
thought or inspiration necessary to produce a genuine "work of art,"
as the Court judged the photograph of Oscar Wilde.61 However, any
such exalted view of "authorship" was rejected in the third Supreme
Court case, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., where the
works at issue were chromolithographs illustrating various circus
acts.6" The trial court held that illustrations of such modest
pretensions, used only for advertising, were beyond the protection
of copyright.' The Supreme Court disagreed, calling it "a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."6' If courts were
to judge aesthetics, some "works of genius" would go unappreciated
because "[t]heir very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke." 5
At the same time, "copyright would be denied to pictures which
(discussing the meaning of "foreign authorship" for purposes of a tariff statute, and concluding
that "for a thing to be the work of an 'author,' it must be something that is more or less the
product of mental activity as distinguished from that which is purely mechanical"). The
distinction between maker and thinker is further illustrated in Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D.
627 (1883), an English case discussed in the Burrow-Giles opinion. The plaintiffs arranged a
photograph of a cricket team and sold prints they made from the negative. Both the plaintiffs
and the photographer who exposed the negative claimed to be the author of the photograph.
The arguments of the latter prevailed:
Brett, M. R., said, in regard to who was the author: "The nearest I can come to,
is that it is the person who effectively is as near as he can be, the cause of the
picture which is produced, that is, the person who has superintended the
arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons in
position, and arranging the place where the people are to be-the man who is
the effective cause of that." Lord Justice Cotton said: "In my opinion, 'author'
involves originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, the
thing which is to be protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a
photograph;" and Lord Justice Bowen says that photography is to be treated for
the purposes of the act as an art, and the author is the man who really
represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or imagination.
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61 (quoting Nottage, 11 Q.B.D. at 632, 635). InNottage, it appears
that both parties contributed to the thinking and the making, though at different stages.
61. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
62. "One of the designs was of an ordinary ballet, one of a number of men and women,
described as the Stirk family, performing on bicycles, and one of groups of men and women
whitened to represent statues." Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
63. See id. at 240-41.
64. Id. at 251. Further, "[a] picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject
of copyright that it is used for an advertisement." Id.
65. Id.
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appealed to a public less educated than the judge."6 6 Such works
should not be denied protection for their failure to "promote the
progress" of the arts. 7 "[I]f they command the interest of any public,
they have a commercial value ... and the taste of any public is not to
be treated with contempt.'
The most interesting aspect of the Bleistein opinion, other than
the conclusion that copyrightability is not a question of aesthetic
merit, is the discussion of authorial personality. Copyright could not
be denied to the circus illustrations simply because they were said
to be realistic portrayals drawn from life.69 Others, if they wished,
could make their own depictions of the same scenes, "copy[ing] the
original," but they could not "copy the copy."7° The "copy" is "the
personal reaction of the individual upon nature," reflecting the
unique personality of the author: "Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting,
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible,
which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless
there is a restriction in the words of the act."71 The Court
emphasized "personality" as a source of originality, that "something
irreducible, which is one man's alone," but stopped short of de-
claring personality the essence of authorship.7" Perhaps it is the
"singularity" of a work, a by-product of personality, which marks it
as original. If so, some works devoid of personality might take their
"singularity" from some other source--even a random source-and
still qualify as original works of authorship. The Court, however,
had no need in Bleistein to split hairs with such precision.
B. A Spark of Creativity
The modern authority on questions of authorship and originality
is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.73 The
66. Id. at 251-52.
67. See id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 252.
69. Id. at 249. "The opposite proposition would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or
Whistler was common property because others might try their hand on the same face." Id.
70. Id
71. Id. at 250.
72. Id. at 250-51.
73. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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defendant copied telephone listings from plaintiff Rural's white
pages directory, in which names, addresses and telephone numbers
were organized in the conventional, alphabetical format.7 The issue
was whether copyright protection could be claimed for facts such as
telephone numbers, or even for a compilation of facts7" when
selected and arranged in such an obvious manner.
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court identified
"originality" as the "sine qua non of copyright."76 The Court held
that the terms "authors" and "writings" in Article I, Section 8"
presuppose "a degree of originality."" Adopting the Burrow-Giles
definition of "author" as "he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker,"7" the Court held that facts are not works of
authorship:
[Flacts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To borrow
from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its "maker" or
"originator".... "The discoverer merely finds and records.8
74. Id. at 342-44.
75. "Compilation" is defined in the Copyright Act as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Compilations are within the subject matter of copyright, but rights to a
compilation "extendO only to the material contributed by the author of such work" and "dou
not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material." Id. § 103.
76. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
78. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
79. Id. (quotingBurrow.Giles, 111 U.S. at 57-58).
80. Id. at 347. On the other hand, compilations of facts may be original. As the Feist Court
explained:
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order
to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used
effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as
they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of
creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations
through the copyright laws. Thus, even a directory that contains absolutely no
protect[able] written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum
for copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.
Id. at 348 (citations omitted). Copyright may also be obtained for an original manner of
expressing uncopyrightable facts. See id. ("Thus, if the compilation author clothes facts with
an original collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this written
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In its definition of "originality," Feist adds something to Burrow-
Giles:
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or
obvious" it might be.81
Rural's telephone book proved the exception, failing to exhibit even
the dimmest spark of "creativity." The listings were "entirely
typical" and "garden variety." 2 Since Rural gathered and alpha-
betized the information, "technically speaking," the directory
"owe[d] its origin to Rural." 3 However, the Court observed "there is
nothing remotely creative about arranging names'alphabetically in
a white pages directory.... It is not only unoriginal, it is practically
inevitable."8 4 Lacking even a minimal level of creativity, Rural's
directory failed the test of originality.
It is difficult to define that extra element of creativity without
which a work is not original, nor its creator an author, even in the
absence of copying from other works. Creativity is not the same as
novelty. A work may be indistinguishable from its predecessors, but
still creative and original, so long as the similarity is "fortuitous,
not the result of copying.' If a poet who had never read Keats
expression. Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise
words used to present them.").
81. Id. at 345 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 362.
83. Id. at 363.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 345; see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663, 668 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) ("A work is novel if it differs from existing works in some
relevant respect. For a work to be copyrightable, it must be original and creative, but need not
be novel."); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) ('Originality is
... distinguished from novelty; there must be independent creation, but it need not be
invention in the sense of striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty, since the
Constitution differentiates 'authors' and their 'writings' from 'inventors' and their
'discoveries.").
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miraculously duplicated his "Ode on a Grecian Urn," the poet, in
theory, could copyright his work.86 Creativity appears, rather, to
require some "work of the brain," or "intellectual labor."8 7
Even if the alphabetizing were handled by a computer, some
Rural employee must have supervised the process. Evidently, that
kind of "intellectual labor" does not suffice. In fact, if Rural had
alphabetized the listings by hand, a task that requires some mental
effort, the Court would still have dismissed that activity as "so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever."
8
"Creativity," as the Feist Court described it, seems to require
not just "work of the brain" but an exercise of the imagination
-the formation of a mental conception ultimately given tangible
expression in a work of authorship. 9
The Court described Rural's alphabetical organization as
supremely ordinary: "It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a
matter of course.... This time-honored tradition does not possess the
minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the
Constitution.' The emphasis on past practice seems, on its face, to
contradict the Court's assurances that creativity does not require
novelty.9' The unspoken assumption, and certainly a reasonable
one, may be that Rural borrowed or "copied" its organizational
scheme from the countless white pages directories that had been
published before.92
86. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,54 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.).
87. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (-[A] modicum ofintellectual labor ... clearly constitutes an
essential constitutional element.' (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (1990))); see also Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668 n.6 ("A work
is original if it is the independent creation of its author. A work is creative if it embodies some
modest amount of intellectual labor.").
88. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 ("[Ojriginality is not astringent standard; it does not require
that facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way. It is equally true, however, that
the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no
creativity whatsoever.").
89. Id. ("Ain author who claims infringement must prove the existence of... intellectual
production, of thought, and conception.' (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60)).
90. Id. at 363.
91. Id. at 345.
92. David Nimmer points out the many different ways that one could deal with
geographical distinctions and unusual names even in an otherwise conventionally
alphabetized telephone directory. So many choices must be made, he argues, that the
resulting directory is necessarily "a profoundly unique compilation." Nimmer, supra note 17,
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C. A Clap of Thunder
The cases discussed so far dealt with works that were deliberately
conceived and purposefully executed-an artistically composed
photograph, an elaborate circus illustration, a precisely organized,
if unimaginative, telephone directory. A somewhat different take on
authorship was provided by Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc.," a case which considered unplanned variations as a potential
source of authorship.
The works at issue in Alfred Bell were mezzotint engravings
of well-known paintings in the public domain. 4 The mezzotint
process95 requires labor, patience, and considerable skill, but in the
right hands it can produce a faithful reproduction of a painting.
96
The defendant produced and sold color lithographs made from the
mezzotints, prompting the producers of the mezzotints to file suit.
The issue before the court was whether the mezzotint engravings
were sufficiently "original" to be copyrighted.97
As the district court explained, the mezzotint engravers at-
tempted to reproduce the original painting, "so that the basic idea,
arrangement, and color scheme of each painting are those of the
original artist."9 8 Nevertheless, "[iut is not ... possible to make a
photographic copy of [a] painting by this method exact in all its
details."' The engraver must exercise "individual conception,
judgment and execution" to produce the desired effect, and "[n]o two
engravers [therefore] can produce identical interpretations of the
same oil painting." 1°°
at 97-98. Convincing as Professor Nimmer's point may be, Feist appears to overlook it,
treating the plaintiffs directory as the "practically inevitable," predestined, uncreative
offspring of copied facts and a copied system. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. Hence, unlike Professor
Nimmer, I do not view Feist as strong support for the disassociation of originality and
distinctiveness. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 96-97.
93. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
94. Id.
95. A detailed description of the mezzotint process can be found in the opinion of the
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The Second Circuit held that an "original" work need not be
"strikingly unique or novel," but merely a "'distinguishable
variation;'"' 1 it must include something more than "trivial"
contributed by the author and "recognizably 'his own."
102
"Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of
actual copying."' 3 One could debate the quantum of originality
indicated by "distinguishable" or "[non]trivial," but the most
interesting statements in Alfred Bell concern the nature of
originality:
[The mezzotints] 'originated' with those who made them .... There
is evidence that they were not intended to, and did not, imitate
the paintings they reproduced. But even if their substantial
departures from the paintings were inadvertent, the copyrights
would be valid. A copyist's bad eyesight or defective
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield
sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a
variation unintentionally, the "author" may adopt it as his and
copyright it. 4
In a footnote, the court repeats a story told by Plutarch, where "[a]
painter, enraged because he could not depict the foam that filled a
horse's mouth from champing at the bit, threw a sponge at his
painting; the sponge splashed against the wall-and achieved the
desired result." 5
Lucky accidents are familiar in patent law, where the means
of discovery are irrelevant to the patentability of the invention."°
As the court in Alfred Bell observed, "Imlany great scientific
discoveries have resulted from accidents, e.g., the galvanic circuit
and the x-ray."'0 7 The principle of the microwave oven is said to
have been discovered when a scientist working with microwave
101. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102 (quoting Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc.,
23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)).
102. Id. at 103 (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512,513 (2d Cir. 1927)).
103. Id. (quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586
(E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
104. Id. at 104-05.
105. Id. at 105 n.23.
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.").
107. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105 n.25.
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communications equipment found a candybar melted in his
pocket.108 But it is perhaps a leap to ask the reader to "[clompare"
such technological discoveries to "inadvertent errors in a trans-
lation," a matter of literary expression rather than scientific
advancement. "
The comments in Alfred Bell may have been superceded by Feist's
notion of "creativity" or Feist's distinction between "creation" and
"discovery." On the other hand, Alfred Bell could suggest merely a
broad interpretation of the principles that Feist announced. The
artist who suffers from "defective musculature," or who is startled
by a "clap of thunder," still produces something that would not exist
if the artist did not exist. In terms of physical causation, if not
intellectual planning, the artist could view the inadvertent
product of his efforts as "created" rather than "discovered." The
work could also be considered "creative" in a sense that Rural's
white pages were not: slip-of-the-pen artistry tends to be unique
and distinctive"q°-the antithesis of the predictable, "practically
inevitable,"' product of "an age-old practice, firmly rooted in
tradition.""2 Alternatively, if "creativity" requires deliberation,
imagination, or other "work of the brain," one could find those
attributes in the artist's after-the-fact recognition of the value in his
"mistake." As the court said in Alfred Bell, "[hiaving hit upon such
a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his and
copyright it.""' Here, however, one risks crossing the line between
"creation" and "discovery," because any discovery may be "adopted"
as one's own. In any event, Alfred Bell suggests an approach to
authorship which, though a fruitful source of speculation, has
probably seen more life in law school hypotheticals-along the lines
of the photograph snapped by the dropped camera-than in
practical application. As the cases discussed in the next section
108. See Linda Kulman, Ode to the Microwave, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 7, 1997, at
16.
109. See Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105 n.25.
110. See JOHN R. PIERCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION THEORY: SYMBOLS, SIGNALS
AND NOISE 264 (1980) ("A completely random visual pattern, like a completely random
acoustic wave or a completely random sequence of letters, is mathematically the most
surprising, the least predictable of all possible patterns.").
111. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
112. Id.
113. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105 (emphasis added).
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illustrate, courts generally view indeterminacy as inconsistent with
authorship.
D. Random Numbers
Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co."4 concerned a manufacturer's
system of numbering lawn care machines and replacement parts.
Although Toro was decided before Feist and it appears to endorse
the now discredited "sweat of the brow" approach to factual
compilations,"l5 its discussion of random numbering schemes bears
consideration. The defendant published a catalog of parts that could
be substituted for Toro's. The catalog reproduced the names and
numbers of Toro's original parts and, next to each, the number of
the defendant's substitute part. The defendant's numbers were
identical to Toro's, except preceded by the letter "R.""' Toro alleged
that the unauthorized reproduction of its part numbers-generally
"five or six digit numbers with a hyphen inserted somewhere"-
constituted a copyright infringement.117
The court found that Toro had assigned part numbers arbitrarily:
"There was no evidence that a particular series or configuration of
numbers denoted a certain type or category of parts or that the
numbers used encoded any kind of information at all. In short,
numbers were assigned to a part without rhyme or reason.""8 The
court held the numbers themselves to be in the public domain," 9 as
the words in a dictionary are in the public domain, and concluded
that "[tlhe random and arbitrary use of numbers in the public
domain does not evince enough originality to distinguish author-
ship." 20 The court did not go so far as to deny protection to all
114. 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
115. See id. at 1213 (referring to a prior case in which the court found a white pages
telephone directory original because "the directory's author had 'solicited, gathered, filed,
sorted, and maintained the information' used in the directory") (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 1210.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1213.
119. Id. ("There is no variation, other than the trivial hyphen, to establish authorship.").
120. Id. The court explained:
[llt is clear that no effort or judgment went into the selection or composition of
the numbers, which distinguishes this case from the [pre-Feist] telephone
directory cases. We are left, then, with the accidental marriage of a part and a
number. We do not believe that such a marriage produces an original work of
589
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numbering systems, but regarded only those numbering systems
"that use[]symbols in some sort of meaningful pattern, something
by which one could distinguish effort or content" as copyrightable
"original work[s] ."'1
Toro's claim was certainly problematic. Although its catalog
might be considered a copyrightable work, its parts numbers are
less obviously "works of authorship." Considered in the aggregate,
its numbering scheme could be considered a "system,"'22 which is
uncopyrightable under § 102(b) of the Copyright Act.123 Considered
individually, its parts numbers could be considered facts, which
likewise are uncopyrightable.'24 Yet, rather than focus on these
peculiar characteristics of numbering schemes, the Eighth Circuit
offered broader observations on the nature of "authorship," which
would cast into doubt, for example, the copyrightability of a
randomly-generated piece of music. Those observations are subject
to criticism.
authorship. Appellant simply has not added enough to its parts numbers to
make them original and remove them from the public domain.
Id.
121. Id.
122. The Seventh Circuit might dispute that characterization. In American Dental Ass'n
v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997), the court held that a taxonomy
codifying dental procedures was not an uncopyrightable "system," apparently because it did
not "come with instructions for use, as if [it] were a recipe for a new dish." Id. at 980. The
court may have understood "system" to apply only to processes as opposed to logical
organizations; however, the Copyright Act explicitly provides that copyright does not apply
to "procedure[s], process[es] [and] methodis] of operation." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). If
.system" is limited as the Seventh Circuit implied, it would render an already redundant list
even more so. One might also argue that a random numbering scheme is not a "system"
because its very nature is unsystematic. Yet, once the random numbers take on meaning by
their association with particular parts, the use of those numbers to refer to those parts does
seem, in ordinary terms, a "system" for referring to those parts. All one can really say is that
the meaning of "system" is debatable.
123. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
... system ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
124. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. This point is also highly debatable. The
prohibition of copyrighting facts is based on the distinction between "creation" and
"discovery." See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). An
arbitrarily-assigned part number is not a "discovery;" it has to be devised. On the other hand,
once the number is assigned, it becomes a point of information to which others may have
legitimate reasons to refer. Rather than treat this information as a "fact," one should perhaps
apply a "fair use" analysis. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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First, even if numbers as such are in the public domain, it does
not follow that a system of assigning those numbers to lawnmower
parts must also be in the public domain. Unlike the numbers, the
system of assigning them had its origin with the employees of
Toro.'25 If the system reflected no "rhyme or reason," Toro could still
say of it '[a] poor thing but mine own.,"1 26 Further, Toro suggests
that an "original" work must have "content" that communicates
information, or at least reflects judgment in its design-a suggestion
contrary to the spirit of Bleistein, which recognizes copyright in the
humblest of creative efforts,1 27 and Alfred Bell, which finds any
"distinguishable variation[]" sufficiently original, even if caused by
a slip of a pen.22 Finally, Toro provides an odd contrast to other
cases implying that the constraints imposed by "rhyme or reason"
would diminish, rather than enhance, claims of authorship. 129 In
American Dental Ass'n, for example, Judge Easterbrook found that
the numerous choices available to the author of a guide describing
and numbering dental procedures rendered the guide "original."'30
The choices were discretionary; they were not a case of "knuckling
under to an order imposed on language by some 'fact' about dental
procedures."' 3 ' Toro seems to hold that a numbering scheme is
"original" only if it "knuckl[es] under" to the influence of some
external order.'32 Yet the "accidental marriage of a part and a
number"'33 would seem to produce a more original offspring than a
marriage imposed by some aspect of the parts themselves.
125. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1210-13.
126. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432,433 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding
the character of Superman copyrightable, even if it is a modest addition to the literature of
heroic figures).
127. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
129. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213. If an idea can be expressed in only a limited number of ways,
.merger" bars exclusive rights in any particular form of expression. See Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) ("When the 'idea' and its
'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since protecting
the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the Idea' upon the
copyright owner....").
130. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
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A subsequent case from the Tenth Circuit, Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel,
Inc.," demonstrates that the reluctance to characterize random
numbers as works of authorship continues after Feist. Mitel sought
to protect a set of four-digit "command codes" used to control its
telecommunications equipment. 35 Iqtel concluded that its own
systems must be controlled by the same codes; because Mitel
dominated the market, technicians who installed the systems might
be unwilling to learn a second set of command codes."3 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the denial of Mitel's request for a preliminary
injunction." 7 Although Mitel's system could be characterized as a
"method of operation,"" the system's details might include
elements of"protectable expression."'39 The court, nevertheless, held
the assignment of command codes too arbitrary to be original."4
"[Pilaintiffts own expert testified that Mitel's registers were
arbitrary and 'real close to random,' and that there is no evidence of
anyone trying to 'put their mark' on the codes."'" This requirement
that authors "put their mark" on their creations is a curious
inversion of Bleistein, which observed that authors do put their
mark on their works, almost involuntarily: "[A] very modest grade
of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone.""'
134. 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
135. As the court stated:
Mitel and Iqtel manufacture competing call controllers. A call controller is a
piece of computer hardware that enhances the utility of a telephone system by
automating the selection of a particular long distance carrier and activating
optional features such as speed dialing....
... In order to activate and manipulate the features of its call controller, Mitel
devised an instruction set of over sixty four-digit numeric command codes. Mitel
published and copyrighted manuals describing how to program its call controller
by using these command codes.
Id. at 1368.
136. See id. at 1369.
137. Id. at 1376.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any ... method of operation ... regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
139. Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1372.
140. See id at 1374.
141. Id.; see also id. at 1373-74 ("Scott Harper, a Mitel marketer who selected some of the
'registers' and 'descriptions,' testified that he selected the numbers arbitrarily, without any
attempt to place his mark on them.").
142. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
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In Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 14 a federal district court
in Pennsylvania recently held a numbering system to be original
and copyrightable. In this case, the numbers designated various
fasteners, or "retractable captive-screw assemblies," which Southco
offered for sale.1" Each part was described by a nine-digit number:
the first two described the product class, and the others described
"functional characteristics" of the part, such as "installation type,
thread size, recess type (phillips or slotted), grip length, type of
material, and knob finish."1' In a sense, the numbers formed "a
language, communicating functional details of the hardware.""6
Because the system was not random, it could be copyrighted:
The numbers are not assigned at random or in sequence; they
are assigned based on the properties of the parts. The
Numbering System is a complex code expressing numerous
detailed features of Southco hardware products; each part
number tells the story of a part's size, finish, and utility.... The
Numbering System evidences creativity and effort reflecting the
judgment the Toro and Mitel courts found lacking in those
cases. 147
The Third Circuit reversed on appeal,"48 distinguishing between
the numbering system, which Southco had conceded to be uncopy-
rightable," and the particular numbers assigned to particular
Southco parts."5 Because of the inflexible nature of the numbering
system, assigning numbers to parts was an inevitable, mechanical,
and uncreative process and therefore uncopyrightable.' 51
143. 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1490 (BNA) (E.D. Pa. 2000), rev'd, 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001).
144. Id. at 1491.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1494.
148. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 149 (3d Cir. 2001).
149. See id. at 152 n.6. The reason for the concession was probably § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which disallows copyright on any 'system." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
150. See Southco, 258 F.3d at 151 ("For purposes of copyright law ... Southco's numbering
system itself and the actual numbers produced by the system are two very different works.").
151. Id. at 153. The court explained:
Southco unquestionably devoted time, effort, and thought to the creation of the
numbering system, but Southco's system makes it impossible for the numbers
themselves to be original. Under that system, there is simply no room for
creativity when assigning a number to a new panel fastener. The part has
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The subtext of each of these cases is the defendant's desire to
facilitate competition with a market leader, either by numbering its
own parts according to their ability to substitute for the plaintiffs
parts, or, as in Mitel, to produce a functional compatibility. Yet
whether or not the numbering scheme is random has little to do
with the issue of competition. One could argue, in either case, that
the plaintiffs market dominance has rendered its numbering
scheme a "fact" to which others must refer in order to compete.
152
Indeed, competitors might have an even greater need to refer to a
numbering scheme that reflects some "rhyme or reason." At the
same time, the dismissal of random works as "unoriginal" denies
copyrights to works that do not raise external competitive issues,
such as randomly generated works of art. If the goal really is to
ensure competition in separate products such as lawnmower
parts or telephone systems, it would be preferable to treat the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs numbering scheme as a "fair use of
a copyrighted work." 5 '
certain relevant characteristics, and the numbering system specifies certain
numbers for each of those characteristics. As a result, there is only one possible
part number for any new panel fastener that Southco creates. This number
results from the mechanical application of the system, not creative thought.
Id.
152. Treating an "original" arrangement, such as a numbering scheme, as the equivalent
of a fact may be controversial, even if the arrangement has become a standard which one must
adopt in order to compete. In Arthur Miller's view:
The parallel to a standardization argument is apparent: popular systems are to
lose their copyright protection merely because their popularity denominates
them "standards," a proposition that would not be taken seriously if the
copyrighted works were Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath, Hemingway's The Sun
Also Rises, or Miller's Death of a Salesman.
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977,1020 (1993). Miller
referred to the Ninth Circuit's recognition of a "'market for Sega-compatible video game
cartridges in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993),
amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993), apparently because Sega offered
one of a small number of popular video game formats. Treating a product numbering scheme
as a copyable standard, however, would be far less objectionable than treating a popular
novel, or even a popular videogame format, as a standard. The competition made possible by
the free adoption of a numbering scheme would be in a separate product, not in a market
defined by the fruits of the first author's expression.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1600,
1602 (1982) ("'Fair use' ... seeks to accommodate the author's need for remuneration and
control while recognizing that in specific instances the author's rights must give way before
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Although such competitive issues clearly motivated the parties in
these random-number cases, the decisions reflect something more
fundamental and, in a sense, more philosophical: the unwillingness
of the courts to associate authorship with accident. Perhaps, even
after Bleistein and Feist, courts sense that random creations are
unworthy of recognition because they lack "something by which one
could distinguish effort or content."'54 Perhaps courts consider
random creations inherently worthless, in spite of the parties'
willingness to litigate. Or perhaps they see randomly generated
works as too mechanical or inhuman to be encompassed within the
idea of "authors" and their "writings."
The Copyright Office seems to share the latter sentiment,
categorizing at least some random works as works "not originated
by a human author.""s The Compendium of Copyright Office
Practices states the following:
In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a work must
be the product of human authorship. Works produced by
mechanical processes or random selection without any con-
tribution by a human author are not registrable. Thus, a
linoleum floor covering featuring a multicolored pebble design
which was produced by a mechanical process in unrepeatable,
random patterns, is not registrable. Similarly, a work owing its
form to the forces of nature and lacking human authorship is not
registrable; thus, for example, a piece of driftwood even if
polished and mounted is not registrable."s
This statement might provide room for indeterminate works that
include some "contribution by a human author," either in defining
the parameters of the random processes, setting them in motion, or
a social need for access and use."). The recent case of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000), suggests such an approach. Although the
plaintiffs PlayStation BIOS computer software was copyrightable subject matter, the court
held that copying that software in order to "reverse engineer" it and produce a competitive (or
partially competitive) product was a "fair use." Id. at 608. In Southco, the Third Circuit
declined to consider whether the defendant's use of Southco's parts numbers, which had
become an industry standard, should be considered fair use. Southo, 258 F.3d at 151.
154. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
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sifting through the results. The rule also fails to state whether a
work devised by a human but having no "rhyme or reason" is "the
product of human authorship."1"7
Before considering the theoretical justifications for recognizing-
or denying-authorship in indeterminate works, it is worth a brief
survey of the use of indeterminate processes in the arts. In spite of
the courts' apparent low regard for indeterminate works-though
expressed in the context of numbering systems rather than more
elaborate creations-at least some artists, writers, and composers
have viewed indeterminacy as a legitimate aspect of creativity.
II. INDETERMINACY AND THE ARTS
The use of indeterminacy as a creative element has a longer
history than one would suspect. In the eighteenth century, Mozart
created a Musikalisches Wiirfelspiel (Musical Dice Game) con-
sisting of a series of musical fragments and a table158 to guide their
assembly. 9 One can "compose" one's own version of the work, a
minuet and trio, by rolling a pair of dice and using the outcome to
select the next measure of the piece as directed by the table."c°
Mozart provided 176 measures from which to choose for the minuet
and ninety-six measures for the trio. 61 The number of possible
combinations is approximately 1.3 x 109' 62-a number so vast it
essentially guarantees that every "new" version of the work has
never been experienced before, even by Mozart, and will never be
experienced again.
If chance composition was a game for Mozart, some twentieth
century artists elevated indeterminacy to a philosophical principle.
Jean Arp, an artist associated with the Dada movement, is famous
for a series of collages said to have been arranged by the 'law of
157. Id.
158. The table is reproduced in JOHN CAGE 101 (Richard Kostelanetz ed., 1970).
159. John Chuang has prepared a website devoted to Mozart's dice game. The site allows
visitors to "compose" and play their own realizations of Mozart's minuet. John Chuang,
Mozart's Musikalisches Wiurfelspiel: A Musical Dice Game for Composing a Minuet, at
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chance.'"'" According to the story,' Arp discovered the "law of
chance" in 1916 when, frustrated at his inability to compose a
drawing in the manner he wished, he tore the paper to pieces and
let the scraps fall to the floor. 6 ' Afterwards, in the chance
arrangement of discarded paper, Arp recognized the very com-
position he had been unable to achieve."
Arp's collages are not entirely random. Although there is no
record of precisely how they were made,' 7 the works themselves
show signs of conscious intervention. As one historian observed, "the
homogeneity of collage elements, the care with which they are
pasted, the absence of overlapping, and the harmonious balance of
the compositions attest to Arp's deliberate aesthetic choices."le
Even if Arp simply let the pieces fall and pasted them where they
lay, he must have selected the size, shape, and color of the pieces.
These are "chance works" only in the sense that Arp "tipped [the]
balance between accident and deliberation more than usual in
the direction of accident."169 They are significant, primarily, as
expressions of the idea of chance as an aesthetic principle. 7 °
Arp found that idea compelling. By '"eliminating all volition' in
favor of the workings of chance, Arp believed that he could summon
quasi-divine forces to his aid.' Arp described the "law of chance" as
the supreme law "which 'comprises all other laws and surpasses our
163. Jane Hancock, Arp's Chance Collages, in DADA/DIMENSIONS 47 (Stephen C. Foster ed.,
1985) (quoting Jean Arp). For an example of Arp's work, see id. at 49.
164. Some are skeptical of that story. See id. at 48 ("If Arp did make collages that way, they
are not the same ones that we know today.").
165. Id. at 47.
166. See HARRET ANN WATTS, CHANCE: A PERSPECTIVE ON DADA 51 (1980). The story
mirrors the Plutarch anecdote recounted in Alfred Bell. See supra text accompanying note
105.
167. Hancock, supra note 163, at 54.
168. Id. at 48. According to Jane Hancock-
Arp incorporated an element of chance in most of his works, a fact known from
his essays and accounts of his methods. Yet, he exerted a great degree of
conscious control and aesthetic judgment over the final results in his reliefs and
sculptures, a fact most evident in their suave contours and unblemished finish.
Arp explained elsewhere that accidents alone could not produce art; art required
the imprint of human aspirations.
Id. at 65.
169. Id. at 48.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
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understanding,""72 the source of life and "'primal cause.'""' Chance
results, Arp insisted, are anything but meaningless; they are the
tangible product of "providential guidance." 17 4 "'Chance' in the
art of our time," said Arp, "is nothing accidental, but a gift of the
Muses." 75 Arp viewed his experiments with chance as a kind of
collaborative endeavor. The abandonment of conscious volition calls
into play both the subconscious mind'76 and external forces that
speak through the subconscious."' The most successful artist, Arp
believed, is the artist most attentive to those external influences. '
7 8
To a degree, chance composition is an exercise in self negation, or,
in Arp's terms, "restoring the artist to an attitude of humility vis-&-
vis man's experience of the world and his role as a creator within
that world."'79
Marcel Duchamp is another artist of the Dada movement who
experimented with chance operations. In one instance, marks left by
matchsticks shot from a toy cannon became an element of the
172. Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citation omitted). Arp further stated:
Moving poems, sculptures, paintings, songs that were sent to me from the Muses
apparently accidentally, "on approval" and with no obligation to buy, fell to the
dreamers as beautiful chance.... He who can still experience life in our times as
a dream still has the good fortune to encounter the Muses.
Id.
176. Arp's references to a dream-like state as the most receptive to divine favors suggests
a powerful role for the subconscious in artistic creation. See id. ("This spiritual gift falls only
to dreamers."') (citation omitted). "Arp's emphasis on chance is ... a means of getting at these
'processes of creation' on a level more profound than that of totally conscious, controlled
creation." WATTs, supra note 166, at 71.
177. See Hancock, supra note 163, at 65.
178. See id.
179. WATTS, supra note 166, at 70. Arp did not resign himself to complete passivity. See id.
at 52.
[Miuch of Arp's most fruitful experimentation with chance consists in his
allowing random intrusions to offer him new points of departure, which he then
controls in their development. Chance does not have the opportunity to make
any absolute formal decisions.... Chance for Arp is a stimulus to further
variations, not to a "canned," inalterable result.
Id. When working on his papiers ddchirds (Torn Papers) series of collages, in which his
sensibilities interfered least with the workings of chance, Arp felt himself contented but
diminished as an artist: 'When I make papiers ddchirs, I feel happy. What diverts me once
again from these procedures is the fact that there is no longer a person forming within me.
I gain peace and calm but lose as a creator."' Hancock, supra note 163, at 65 (citation omitted).
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composition. 80 In another, Duchamp allowed dust to settle on the
work, where it was affixed to and made a part of the work.'8 '
Duchamp is best known for his "ready-mades"'S2 -mundane objects
that Duchamp discovered and, with a minimum of manipulation,
presented as works of art. The most notorious of these is the
inverted urinal on display at the Centre Georges Pompidou in
Paris."3 The ready-mades are not indeterminate in the way that
works constructed by random processes are indeterminate;
presumably the objects were carefully designed, if not for the
purposes of art. They are indeterminate only in the sense that the
objects are faits accomplis, and are for that reason, beyond
Duchamp's ability to control. The objects were, of course, selected by
Duchamp, but in his selection Duchamp labored to suppress his
conscious judgment:
I had to pick an object without it impressing me and, as far as
possible, without the least intervention of any idea or suggestion
of aesthetic pleasure. It was necessary to reduce my personal
taste to zero. It is very difficult to select an object that has
absolutely no interest to us not only on the day we pick it but
which never will and which, finally, can never have the
possibility of becoming beautiful, pretty, agreeable or ugly.'8
Chance operations seem to make a work less personal, by taking
some of the artist's aesthetic judgment "out of the loop," but
Duchamp, paradoxically, saw chance as a means for uncovering a
deeper individuality.' Chance is an antidote to "taste," which
Duchamp condemned as habit.' The surest way to avoid habit, to
produce "the exception, the unique, unreproducible event,"'87 is to
180. See WATTS, supra note 166, at 37.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 41.
183. See id. at 42.
184. Id. (citation omitted).
185. See id. at 41 ("Duchamp, who demanded anonymity on other levels, turns to chance
for the final distinctive individual stamp, an individuality that can be conveyed beyond the
plane of the artist's 'aesthetic consciousness.') (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 34. "Une habitude. La rdpdtition d'une chose ddjh acceptde." Id. at 35 (quoting
Marcel Duchamp).
187. Id. at 38.
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rely on chance.ls Moreover, Duchamp, like Arp, regarded chance
operations as an outlet for the subconscious. 189 By whatever means,
the artist's subconscious mind, his true self unburdened by "habit,"
influences the outcome of seemingly random events."9 As Duchamp
succinctly put it: "Your chance is different from mine. " "'
The techniques employed by some modem artists introduce an
element of chance, whether or not the artist cultivates accident for
its own sake. To create his best-known works, American artist
Jackson Pollock poured, dripped, and spattered paint onto canvases
he had placed on the floor.'92 Pollock insisted that the splattering
technique, despite appearances, is highly controlled. 3 Certainly
188. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
189. See WATTS, supra note 166, at 40.
190. See id. ("The individual difference is revealed in the moment of the artist's lack of
conscious control over the real, or figurative, dice throw.").
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. See Robert Goodnough, Pollock Paints a Picture, ARTNEWS, May1951, at 38-41, 60-61,
reprinted in JACKSON POLLOCK: INTERVIEWS, ARTICLES, AND REVIEWS 75 (Pepe Karmel ed.,
1999) [hereinafter POLLOCIK INTERVIEWS]. The article describes Pollock's unique technique,
explaining:
He has found that what he has to say is best accomplished by laying the canvas
on the floor, walking around it and applying paint from all sides. The
paint-usually enamel, which he finds more pliable-is applied by dipping a
small house brush or stick or trowel into the can and then, by rapid movements
of the wrist, arm and body, quickly allowing it to fall in weaving rhythms over
the surface. The brush seldom touches the canvas, but is a means to let color
drip or run in stringy forms that allow for the complexity of design necessary to
the artist.
Id.
193. See Interview by William Wright with Jackson Pollock, The Springs, Long Island, NY
(1950), reprinted in JACKSON POLLOCK: INTERVIEWS, ARTICLES, AND REVmWS 22 (Pepe Karmel
ed., 1999).
WW: Well, isn't [the dripping technique] more difficult to control than a brush?
I mean, isn't there more a possibility of getting too much paint or splattering or
any number of things? Using a brush, you put the paint right where you want it
and you know exactly what it's going to look like.
JP: No, I don't think so. I don't-ah-with experience-it seems to be possible
to control the flow of the paint, to a great extent, and I don't use-I don't use the
accident-'cause I deny the accident.
Id.; see also MATTHEW L. ROHN, VISUAL DYNAMICS IN JACKSON POLLOCK'S ABSTRACTIONS 39-40
(1987) ("Although [Pollock] sought a degree of freedom and serendipity as he worked, most
of his activity remained under his sensitive and controlled judgment.... Genuinely random,
freely generated strokes of paint would have produced uninteresting, static imagery rather
than anything resembling the verve and life of a Pollock."). Pollock could achieve specific
effects "by modulating his movements, by paying heed to how far above the canvas he let loose
with the paint, and by regulating the force with which he propelled it." Id. at 41; see also
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Pollock's works were more deliberate than Max Ernst's Non-
Euclidian Fly, produced by suspending a punctured paint can on a
string and swinging it like a pendulum.19 Yet Pollock could not, as
he flung paint at his canvas, control every detail of the work that
emerged. 95 Pollock's painting seems to have involved a give-and-
take between accident and deliberation; in part he "discovered" the
work as it progressed and adjusted his intentions accordingly."
[Alt some point in the process various physical factors over
which he had little or no control-the viscous nature of the
medium, how it would puddle or flow after it struck the
surface-would come to the fore.... [At times he] allowed the
pure motor activity of pouring paint and the unpredictable
consequences of its actions to take over. Proceeding back and
forth between rational action (the conscious choice of where to
pour, creating a given type of stroke) and irrational or arbitrary
action outside his ken (paint landing even a little off a mark,
puddling in unexpected ways, or dripping across the surface as
the can or stick is pulled away) Pollock achieved highly
improvisational working methods that produced a related open
and improvisational structure to his abstractions. The essential,
CLAUDE CERNUSCHI, JACKSON POLLOCK MEANINGAND SIGNIFICANCE 109,128 (1992). Opinions
vary on the results. Some critics perceive Pollock's work as utterly chaotic. See FRANCIS V.
O'CONNOR, JACKSON POLLOCK 54-55 (1967) (quoting the remarks of critic Bruno Alfieri).
194. See William Rubin, Jackson Pollock and the Modern Tradition, ARTFiORUM, Feb. 1967,
at 14-22, reprinted in POLLOCK: INTERVIEWS, supra note 192, at 167.
195. See ROHN, supra note 193, at 107 ("Among Pollock's abstractions, there is not one
where unexpected, accidental effects cannot be found.").
196. See Jackson Pollock, My Painting, PossIBIxnES, Winter 1947-48, at 78, reprinted in
POLLOCK: INTERVIEWS, supra note 192, at 18. Pollock explained:
When I am in my painting, I'm not aware of what I'm doing. It is only after a
sort of "get acquainted" period that I see what I have been about. I have no fears
about making changes, destroying the image, etc., because the painting has a life
of its own. I try to let that come through. It is only when I lose contact with the
painting that the result is a mess. Otherwise there is pure harmony, an easy
give and take, and the painting comes out well.
Id. As Matthew Rohn noted:
[Pollock] promoted the arbitrary and the accidental and then held both in check
through the development of structural integrity.... To the extent that he left a
certain amount of accident and randomness visible in the finished works, he
wanted these qualities to serve specific dynamic and expressive functions....
Pollock's paintings are filled with these accidental and random irregularities,
which the artist has generally resolved by a counterbalancing element that lies
off center.
ROHN, supra note 193, at 108.
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composed structure always hovered foremost in his mind, while
free and often risky activity substantially modified and
embellished that conception. 197
Pollock's technique may have "tipped [the] balance ... more than
usual in the direction of accident,"'98 but the principle is also true of
works created by more conventional techniques. Often some aspects
of a work of art are carefully planned, some are artifacts of the
materials or the technique, and some are attributable to chance.199
Music has perhaps been the most fertile ground for aesthetic
experiments with chance," ° and the most famous exponent of
chance-derived or "alleatory" music is American composer John
Cage. Cage employed a number of chance devices in the composition
of his works. In Music for Piano (1952-1956), Cage began with the
imperfections in blank sheets of paper. As explained by composer
Michael Nyman:
Cage asked the I Ching" ... how many notes should be used
from each page; whether they are to be played normally, or are
muted or plucked; whether they are sharp, flat or natural, or are
noises to be produced by hand or beater, inside or outside the
piano construction. The corresponding number of imperfections
on a blank sheet of transparent paper were then marked out,
197. ROHN, supra note 193, at 118-119.
198. See Hancock, supra note 163, at 48.
199. See Litman, supra note 4, at 1010 (suggesting that "transformation is the essence of
the authorship process" and that "[slome of this transformation is purposeful; some of it is
inadvertent; much of it is the product of an author's peculiar astigmatic vision").
200. See MICHAEL NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL Music: CAGE AND BEYOND 3 (1981)
("Experimental composers have evolved a vast number of processes to bring about 'acts the
outcome of which are unknown' (Cage).... Processes may range from a minimum of
organization to a minimum of arbitrariness, proposing different relationships between chance
and choice, presenting different kinds of options and obligations.").
201. The I Ching, or Book of Changes, is an ancient Chinese divinatory text used to
interpret "hexagrams" constructed by coin tosses or similar chance procedures. THE
AuTHENTIC I-CHING, at xxiii-xv (Henry Wei trans., 1987). Cage used coin tosses and the I
Ching in the construction of many of his works. See FOR THE BIRDs: JOHN CAGE IN
CONVERSATION WITH DANIEL CHARLES 43 (Richard Gardner trans., Tom Gora & John Cage
eds., 1981) [hereinafter FOR THE BIRDS]; CHRISTOPHER SHULTIS, SILENCING THE SOUNDED
SELF: JOHN CAGE AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENTAL TRADITION 93 (1998) (describing the I
Ching-derived process used in the composition of Imaginary Landscape No. 4). For a more
complete description of Imaginary Landscape No. 4, see infra text accompanying notes 207-
08.
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and registered on a master page on which stave systems had
been drawn. 2
For Atlas Eclipticalis (1961-1962), Cage used the positions of stars
in an atlas to determine the notes of the composition. °3 Other pieces
took their cue from shuffled cards (Theater Pieces, 1960) and
computer programs (HPSCHD, 1969).204
These works owe their form to chance occurrences, but the
compositions are fixed and reproducible. Sometimes Cage rejected
even that much determinacy, preferring works that took shape
only as they were performed.0' In a "happening" entitled Black
Mountain Piece, for example, Cage provided the performers with
"time-brackets" in which to perform, but otherwise allowed the per-
formers to mold their own contributions.2' A more extreme example
of performance indeterminacy is Cage's Imaginary Landscape No.
4 (1951), a piece for twelve radios.2 7 The "performers" are instructed
to tune certain frequencies, for certain times, at certain volumes-
parameters determined, incidentally, by chance operations. In spite
of the directions, the piece will never sound the same twice, because
the sounds available on the selected frequencies will differ with
every performance.208
202. NYMAN, supra note 200, at 53.
203. See id. at 5; Edward Downes,Atlas Eclipticalis with Winter Music (Electronic Version),
in JOHN CAGE, supra note 158, at 143 (noting that the composition "involved chance
operations, including the placing of transparent templates on the pages of the atlas and
inscribing the positions of the stars").
204. See NYMAN, supra note 200, at 5.
205. Richard Kostelanetz, John Cage: Some Random Remarks, in JOHN CAGE, supra note
158, at 203.
[Cage's] "scores" for these recent pieces, though published by a music company,
offer not a precise plan for articulating sound but descriptive (often prose)
instructions for generating activities that, like a football play, are likely to run
out of intentional control-that produce "indeterminate" results. "I never
imagine anything until I experience it," Cage once declared ....
Id.
206. As Cage described it in an interview: "IBjetween minute four and minute eight, say,
someone or a group of people had that time-bracket free. What they were going to do I didn't
know. I knew roughly, but not specifically. I knew that Merce [Cunningham] would be
dancing, but I didn't know what he'd be dancing." JOHN CAGE, supra note 158, at 27.
Performer improvisation is, of course, common in many forms of music, and might be
considered a form of coauthorship as opposed to indeterminacy.
207. See PAUL GRIFFrrHs, CAGE 24-25 (1981).
208. NYMAN, supra note 200, at 53.
603
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:569
Perhaps the ultimate statement in performance indeterminacy,
as well as Cage's most notorious "composition," is 4'33" (1960). The
title refers to the length of the piece, during which period the
performer(s) produce nothing but silence.' ° The work was originally
"performed" by a pianist, who indicated the beginning and end of
"movements" by, respectively, closing and opening the keyboard
lid.° In the score, however, Cage observes that the work "may be
performed by any instrumentalist(s) and the movements may last
any lengths of time."211 The purpose of the piece, to the extent that
it has or needs a purpose, is to allow the audience to experience and
appreciate the sounds that occur in the hall even when the musician
is silent.2 4'33" thus advances indeterminacy to the point that the
composer and the "performer" are taken out of the equation.213
Cage's randomizing techniques far surpass what Mozart
attempted in the Musikalisches Wiirfelspiel. Mozart ensured a
pleasing composition, however the dice fell, by composing fragments
that would inevitably match.214 Like Duchamp in the selection of a
209. The score shows a work in three movements, but the notation for each movement is
identical-simply the word "tacet." The score bears a copyright notice, but this may refer to
the performance notes rather than the composition.
210. This is explained in the performance notes accompanying the score.
211. John Cage, 4"33' (1952).
212. See GRIlqmrmHs, supra note 207, at 28.
Cage has said, and often repeated, that "the music I prefer, even to my own or
anyone else's, is what we are hearing if we are just quiet." 4'33" was thus not
just a comic stunt but a demonstration that the sounds of the environment have
a value no less than that of composed music, for in truth there is no silence ....
Id.; see also NYMAN, supra note 200, at 53 ("Cage had found that 'silence' is full of
(unintentional) sounds which may be of use to the composer and listener.").
213. As recently reported on National Public Radio's All Things Considered, British
composer Mike Batt inserted a silent track on his compact disc recording Classical Graffiti
to separate the principle works from a set of bonus tracks. He jokingly entitled the silent track
A One Minute Silence and attributed it to himself and "Cage." A British performing rights
organization, not amused, accused Batt of infringing the copyright on John Cage's 4'33".
Interview by Robert Siegel with composer Mike Batt All Things Considered (NPR radio
broadcast, July 2, 2002); see also Listen Hard, THE ECONOMIsT, Aug. 31, 2002, at 67. Although
subsequent news reports referred to a six-figure settlement, BBC News World Edition, Silent
Music Dispute Resolved (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http:J/news.bbc.co.uk//hii/entertainment/
music/2276621.stm, one would like to think the figures was $000000.
214. See Henry Cowell, Current Chronicle, in JOHN CAGE, supra note 158, at 100 ("Mozart
eliminated many of the hazards accepted by Cage, for he composed and set down all the
measures that might be called for by the dice; a typical collection of opening measures for the
first cast, a typical set of second measures for the second cast, and so on.").
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ready-made,21 Cage sought to suppress any aesthetic judgment or
expectation about the outcome of his chance operations.21 As Cage's
philosophy developed, his "views gradually changed from 'particular
ideas as to what would be pleasing, toward no ideas as to what
would be pleasing-a position where all results are acceptable and
accepted and 'an error is simply a failure to adjust immediately from
a preconception to an actuality. 217 Cage's intention, it seems, was
"non-intention. 218
Cage's motivations are difficult to pin down, but he appears to
have sought an abolition of ego, which he regarded as a barrier
between the self and an unmediated experience of the cosmos.
219
At a less profound level, he simply disliked telling other people
what to do. 220 Whatever his thinking, Cage's methodology alters
the traditional relationships between composer, performer, and
audience."' The composer, ultimately, "becomes a proposer, one who
215. See supra text accompanying note 182.
216. Cage's composition for radios, see supra text accompanying notes 207-08, illustrates
his refusal to intervene.
Because the figures obtained [by chance operations] do not always correspond
to the center of the band for any given station, the station might happen to be
heard rather vaguely, from the peripheral point along the dial that was
established by the tossing. Similarly, the amplitude numbers are sometimes too
low for audibility. Cage, however, insists on consistency in allowing the
operation of chance, and sticks faithfully to its decisions.
Cowell, supra note 214, at 99.
217. NYMAN, supra note 200, at 53 (citation omitted).
218. See JOHN CAGE, supra note 158, at 27 (referring to the Black Mountain Piece: "What
kind of intention were you dealing with at that time? Non-intention.").
219. See GRifFTHS, supra note 207, at 36. As Paul Griffiths explains:
[Cage] begins from the premise that if art is to be useful ... it must not be
separate from life. The artist is to alert his audience to the beauties of everyday
life, not substitute some beauty of his own, and he can best do this if he takes as
his guide the unwilled creative processes in the world ....
Id.
220. As Cage once remarked, "A composer is simply someone who tells other people what
to do. I find this an unattractive way of getting things done.' NYMAN, supra note 200, at 111
(citation omitted).
221.
D.C.: It's true that many works signed John Cage served as the basis for
performances that differ in every respect according to who performs it. So for you
the performer becomes the composer.
J.C.: Yes, and the audience can become the performer.
D.C.: What does the composer become2
J.C.: He becomes a member of the audience. He starts to listen.
D.C.: Sounds exist before the composer, and they even lead to him; but the
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creates 'opportunities for experience' while denying himself ...
intentions of expressing, limiting, and shaping....
"222
Although the interest of some respected artists in chance
operations should make us pause before dismissing indeterminate
works as inherently worthless, the legal questions essential to
copyright remain. A common theme in these experiments with
chance is the suppression of the artist's conscious will. Artists who
so purposefully distance themselves from what they produce-
removing, in Duchamp's phrase, "the least intervention of any idea
or suggestion of aesthetic pleasure"22 -have perhaps distanced
themselves so far as to renounce any claim of ownership. Perhaps
the very point of these experiments is to abolish authorship of the
kind required by the laws of copyright. Certainly, claims of property
seem crude next to the mystical aspirations many of these artists
profess.224
In the following Parts, I consider how works influenced by various
forms and degrees of indeterminacy might fare as "works of
authorship." As we have seen, courts generally view authorship,
by virtue of the originality requirement, as requiring some form
of intellectual labor, imagination, or planning. Few cases have
addressed that requirement in the context of indeterminacy, but
those that have, with the exception of Alfred Bell, conclude that
wholly indeterminate works lack the essential ingredient. I will
address, from a broader theoretical perspective, whether intellectual
labor should be considered essential to originality and when, if ever,
indeterminate works can be found to satisfy that requirement. I
composer is none other than the performer, who is none other than the audience.
Henceforth it is impossible to distinguish among various roles.
J.C.: They interpenetrate.
FOR THE BIRDS, supra note 201, at 127.
222. GRIFFITHs, supra note 207, at 37.
223. WATrS, supra note 166, at 41.
224. Some who deal in the products of chance are driven more by commerce than by art.
For example, businesses have arisen to provide statisticians, cryptographers, scientists, and
others with sequences of random numbers. Truly random numbers are not as easily obtained
as one might think, because many seemingly random numbers, like those generated by
computers, are actually the product of highly deterministic processes. See George Johnson,
Connoisseurs of Chaos Offer a Valuable Product: Randomness, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,2001, at
Fl. Purveyors of genuine random numbers derive them from unpredictable physical
phenomenon, such as radioactive decay, radio static, or, in one case, the chaotic bubbling of
lava lamps. See id. Whether or not such numbers fit within the regime of copyright, their
compilers would not-most likely-be philosophically opposed to ownership rights.
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begin by examining the justifications for intellectual property in
general.
III. AUTHORSHIP AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Often tangible things can be fully enjoyed only when property
rights ensure exclusivity. One's home would not be one's "castle" if
anyone who wished could enter and occupy it; it would not provide
the privacy, security, or other benefits expected of a home, nor
would one have much incentive to improve it. Ideas, on the other
hand, are a public good, because they may be enjoyed by others
without in any way diminishing their value." Just as navigating by
the beam of a lighthouse takes nothing away from the builder of the
lighthouse or from other sailors, possessing an idea takes nothing
away from the originator of the idea or from anyone else. Thomas
Jefferson, in a famous passage, compared an idea to the flame of a
candle, which can ignite other candles without dimming its own
light.226 One might say the same of the intangible expressions of
ideas that are subject to copyright. As long as the author possesses
a copy of her work, perhaps she has no reason to complain when
others possess their own copies. Yet the law does convey to authors
a property interest in the form of the exclusive rights to reproduce,
distribute, perform, display, and adapt their copyrighted work.
Justifications for those exclusive rights can be roughly grouped into
the categories of natural rights and public benefit theories.
225. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1970); Mark A. Lemley
& Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE
L.J. 147, 184-85 (1998).
226. Jefferson stated:
[The] peculiar character [of an ideal is that no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one
to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently
designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we
breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed., 1903)).
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A. The Natural Rights of Authors and the Social Benefits of
Authorship
Natural-rights theories of property often begin with John Locke's
Second Treatise of Government,227 where he conceded that the world
had been "given ... to men in common .... "228 but held that the fruits
of nature could be owned individually.229 Locke argued that "every
man has a property right in his own person."20 From this, Locke
reasoned that "[tihe labor of [a man's] body and the work of his
hands" are also "properly his."23'
Whatsoever ... he removes out of the state that nature had
provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property. It being by him removed from the common state
nature has placed it in, it has by this labor something annexed
to it that excludes the common right of other men. 22
Locke qualified his statement with the assumption that there would
be "enough and as good left in common for others."2 3
Locke observed that some form of private property is necessary if
the fruits of nature are to be enjoyed. ' An obvious place to draw a
distinction between private property and the commons is where the
addition of labor has distinguished a part of nature from the rest.
2 5
227. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993)
(discussing the influence of Locke's theories on American law).





233. Id.; see Gordon, supra note 227, at 1560-72 (discussing Locke's famous "proviso"). "It
is the proviso ... that gives Locke's theory much of its moral force. Locke here takes a step that
helps to justify an exclusion right, for, with the proviso satisfied, the public's fundamental
entitlements will not be impaired if the owner excludes it from the owned resource." Id. at
1565 (footnote omitted).
234. "[The fruits of nature] being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a
means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use or at all beneficial
to any particular man." LOCKE, supra note 228, at 17. In fact, property may be viewed, in
Locke's system, as a necessary adjunct to the right and duty of self-preservation. See STEPHEN
BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO HUME 174 (1991).
235. Asking where a man begins to own the acorns or apples that he consumes, Locke
[Vol. 44:569608
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Moreover, Locke perceived a divine plan to bequeath nature to "the
industrious and rational"--the sort of people most likely to exert
themselves in improving the commons.236 Labor, rationally applied,
increases the value of what God has bestowed. 2" Hence, Locke
regarded the "private right"' of the laborer as almost self-evidently
just.
Labor is often expended in the creation of intellectual property,
at least if "labor" includes mental as well as physical exertion. It is
no easy task to write a book, compose a symphony, or invent a
better mousetrap. A person who undertakes such labor may feel
deserving of an exclusive interest. 9 Creative effort also improves
the commons by bringing into existence new things. If it is ever a
just metaphor to speak of "mixing" one's labor with the commons, it
is in the context of creative work.
Feist rejected labor, or "sweat of the brow," as the ultimate
justification for copyright."4 Even if the compiler of a telephone
answered: "[It is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That
labor put a distinction between them and [the] common; that added something to them more
than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right."
LOCKE, supra note 228, at 18.
236.
God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit
and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot
be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He
gave it to the use of the industrious and rational-and labor was to be his title
to it-not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.
Id. at 20. Thus labor entitles the laborer to a property interest not so much in compensation
for hardship, but as a consequence of divine planning. See BUCKLE, supra note 234, at 150.
237. See BUCKLE, supra note 234, at 150-51; LOCKE, supra note 228, at 24-25. Even in the
absence of divine intentions, ownership based on the investment can be logically grounded on
the "no-harm principle." Gordon, supra note 227, at 1545 ("If you take the objects I have
gathered you have also taken my labor, since I have attached my labor to the objects in
question. This harms me, and you should not harm me. You therefore have a duty to leave
these objects alone."). The no-harm principle is harder to apply in the context of intellectual
property, where the creator arguably suffers no direct harm when the intangible objects are
taken. See id. at 1545, 1548.
238. LOCKE, supra note 228, at 17.
239. But see Breyer, supra note 225, at 289 n.29 (noting the potential Lockean justification
of intellectual property based on the investment of labor, but observing that "the difficulty
with this theory is that it neither explains why property ought to be created on this basis nor
does it describe our actual practice"). Moreover, "the fact that [a] book is the author's creation
[does not] seem a sufficient reason for making it his property. We do not ordinarily create or
modify property rights, nor even award compensation, solely on the basis of labor expended."
Id. at 289 (footnotes omitted).
240. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1991)
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directory labors long and hard, removing, in Locke's terms, the
compiled information from "the state that nature has provided and
left it in,"2  if the directory lacks "originality" it falls short of what
copyright requires. 2 2 Still, one might consider labor as an essential
component of authorship. Indeed, Feist refers to a "modicum of
intellectual labor" as "an essential constitutional element."2 3 As
long as the labor is creative, as opposed to the kind of labor exerted
in discovering what already exists in the commons, a Lockean point
of view can be generally reconciled with Feist.
Another version of natural rights relies on personality rather
than labor. The personalities of creative people are often reflected
in their work, particularly when the work is of the expressive
variety subject to copyright. To the extent that the work is shaped
by the personality of the creator, the work may be considered, in a
sense, an extension of the creator. To exploit or interfere with the
creation is then to exploit or interfere with the creator.
As Locke is the philosopher most closely associated with natural
rights based on labor, Hegel is most closely associated with natural
rights based on personality.2" Hegel viewed property as a necessary
expression of human "will"; by marking external objects as "mine,"
the will expresses its individuality and freedom.2' One way in
(criticizing the "sweat of the brow" theory as applied to factual compilations, describing the
theory as based on the mistaken notion "that copyright [is] a reward for the hard work that
went into compiling [the] facts.").
241. LOCKE, supra note 228, at 17.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 76-84.
243. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
244. Hegel, however, was well aware of the social benefits rationale specifically applicable
to copyrights and patents. See GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 30 (T.M. Knox trans.,
1952). According to Hegel:
The purely negative, though the primary, means of advancing the sciences and
arts is to guarantee scientists and artists against theft and to enable them to
benefit from the protection of their property, just as it was the primary and most
important means of advancing trade and industry to guarantee it against
highway robbery.
Id.
245. "[Plroperty is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a substantive end."
Id. at 23. Hegel continues:
In property my will is the will of a person; but a person is a unit and so property
becomes the personality of this unitary will. Since property is the means
whereby I give my will an embodiment, property must also have the character
of being 'this' or 'nine.' This is the important doctrine of the necessity of private
property.
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which the will "occupies" external objects" is by giving them
form.247 An object formed by the will of an artist can be transferred
to a new owner, and the new owner may, with the object, take
possession of "the thoughts communicated in it" as well as "the
universal methods of so expressing himself and producing numerous
other things of the same sort."2 Alternatively, the artist can choose
to transfer the object while keeping the "universal ways and means
of multiplying such [objects] ... reserv[ing] them to himself as means
of expression which belong to him."249 Thus Hegel recognized, in
addition to tangible property, intellectual property shaped and
possessed by the will.
More recent theories invoke "personhood" rather than "will,"
while still viewing property as, at least in some cases, an instru-
ment of self-realization.2" People subjectively experience certain
material objects as closely bound with their identities-particularly
unique objects with sentimental associations, such as wedding
rings, family heirlooms, and private homes."' Possessions more
subject to standardization--cars, clothing, books, or furniture-can
by their selection also proclaim the character of their owners.2" 2 If
advertisements are to be taken seriously (and perhaps, at some
level, they should be), we exhibit our values even in our choice of
beverage. To interfere with our things is, therefore, to interfere with
us, and perhaps property rights are sometimes necessary to guard
Id.
246. "Since property is the embodiment of personality, my inward idea and will that
something is to be mine is not enough to make it my property;, to secure this end occupancy
is requisite. The embodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its recognizability by
others." Id. at 25.
247. "We take possession of a thing (a) by directly grasping it physically, (0) by forming it,
and (y) by merely marking it as ours." Id. at 25. "Marking" is the most symbolic form of taking
possession; accordingly, "[iun its objective scope and its meaning, this mode of taking
possession is very indeterminate." Id. at 27.
248. Id. at 29.
249. Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted).
250. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957 (1982)
("The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-
development-to be a person-an individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment.").
251. See id. at 959. Such objects "are closely bound up with personhood because they are
part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world." Id.
252. See id. at 968.
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against such interference."' Trespass may hinder our development
as persons, or may inflict on us feelings of intrusion akin to a breach
of privacy. Although this might seem a disturbingly materialistic
point of view, when the thing is made by us the connection between
personality and material object seems particularly apt. It is
perhaps even more apt when the thing with which we identify is an
abstraction formed in our own mind.
To a very limited extent, copyright law has embraced property
interests based on the author's right of personality. Section 106A of
the Copyright Act254 provides, with respect to certain works of visual
art,"5 rights of attribution5 6 and integrity.257 Some courts have also
advanced tentative steps in the direction of "moral rights" for
authors.256 Still, the primary justification for copyright law is not
the creator's interests-based on labor, will, or personhood-but
society's interests in the things that are created.
The Constitution explicitly states that the object of the copyright
laws is "[to promote the Progress of Science,"25 9 meaning the
progress of knowledge.' ° The grant of exclusive rights to authors "is
253. Of course, personality interests do not account for all property interests. The
proprietor of a jewelry store owns the stock, even though the proprietor's interest is, for the
most part, commercial rather than personal. See id. at 986-87 (discussing a potential
hierarchy of entitlements).
254. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
255. The term "work of visual art" is limited in substantial ways by the definition provided
in § 101. It includes limited edition paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and still
photographs. It does not include, among other things, maps, motion pictures, books, electronic
publications, or works for hire. Id. § 101.
256. The author of a protected work has the right to claim authorship of his or her work,
and to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work that he or she did not
create. Id. § 106A(aXl).
257. Within limits, the author of a protected work can "prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation...." Id. § 106A(aX3)(A).
258. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In Gilliam, the court
found that the edited version of Monty Python broadcast by the defendant "impaired the
integrity of appellants' work and represented to the public as the product of appellants what
was actually a mere caricature of their talents." Id. at 25. The court conceded that "American
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the
personal, rights of authors." Id. at 24. The plaintiff prevailed, however, on theories of license
and misrepresentation, seen as alternative means to "properly vindicate the author's personal
right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form." Id.
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
260. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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intended to motivate the creative activity of authors ... by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired."26 ' Copyright '"rewards the individual author in order
to benefit the public."
262
If the focus of copyright law is on public benefits, as opposed to
the natural rights of authors, then referring to copyright as a
property interest almost overstates the case. After his famous
comparison of an idea to a candle flame2' and his conclusion that
"'[i]nventions ... cannot, in nature, be a subject of property,'"
Jefferson grudgingly admitted that society may choose to grant
exclusive rights to inventors "'as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility .... "64 But the grant of such
rights to inventors, he said, '"may or may not be done, according to
the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
from any body.' 26 One could take the same view of copyright:
Society grants rights to authors only as it sees fit to encourage new
works. Copyright laws may compensate authors for their labors, or
may defend authors from injuries to their "personhood," but they do
so not for the normative reason that they must, but for the practical
reason that such deference to authors enhances their productivity.
26
261. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Harper
& Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
262. Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546,555 (1973); Mazerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219(1954); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
263. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
264. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRiTINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 181 (Washington ed., 1903)).
265. Id.
266. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 136. Nimmer explains:
Under this [instrumentalist] view [adopted by the Supreme Court], the purpose
of copyright is to provide an incentive for individuals to create. Therefore, it is
not the author who enjoys a "natural" right to the fruits of her labor, but society
that will benefit in the long-run through the encouragement of authorship by
affording a temporary "personal gain" during the term of copyright protection.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343,1438,
1446-47 (1989) (criticizing "encouragement theorists" for marginalizing individual desert).
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Authorial rights in most works can be justified by any of the
preceding theories. A typical work of authorship embodies labor and
personality, and society's interest in possessing the work justifies
the grant of exclusive rights. Indeterminate works are not typical.
When chance substitutes for conscious judgment, the justifications
for private ownership come into question; one has to determine what
is truly essential to authorship and the rights that flow from it.
Before considering that question in the context of indeterminate
works, it is worth a brief discussion of the romantic ideal of
authorship and potential alternatives.
B. Romantic and Un-Romantic Authorship
Professor Martha Woodmansee argues that the contemporary
notion of "authorship" is a recent invention, connected with the
appearance of writers in the eighteenth century who could support
themselves by sales of their work.2"' In the former era of patronage,
writers more often assumed the role of craftsmen rather than
original thinkers.' When a work transcended the ordinary, the
credit belonged to the muses or other supernatural agencies.269
It is noteworthy that in neither of these conceptions is the writer
regarded as distinctly and personally responsible for his
creation. Whether as a craftsman or as inspired, the writer of
the Renaissance and neoclassical period is always a vehicle or
instrument: regarded as a craftsman, he is a skilled manipulator
of predefined strategies for achieving goals dictated by his
audience; understood as inspired, he is equally the subject of
independent forces ....'0
In contrast, the new breed of writers credited their achievements to
their own unique inner vision, or "original genius."27 ' Here was born
the romantic notion of the writer as an uncommonly wise, sensitive,
267. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions
of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426 (1984).
268. Id. at 426-27.
269. Id. at 427 ("To explain such moments a new concept was introduced: the writer was
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truth-telling, sometimes misunderstood individual whose message
enlightens the world.272 When a writing is understood as an
expression of the author's individual genius, "the writer becomes an
author (Lat. auctor, originator, founder, creator),"27 and the writer's
claim to a property interest, .particularly one based on natural
rights, becomes more credible.
The romantic ideal of authorship has influenced copyright law,27
though the degree of such influence is debated. 5 The limited
protection of "moral rights," at least, may be premised on the view
that art is a reflection of individual genius. Other aspects of
copyright law are more difficult to reconcile with the romantic
model. The work-for-hire doctrine, for example, treats employers as
the "authors" of works created by their employees. 7 One might
imagine an individual writer or artist as an "'author-genius' with
privileged access to the numinous, "278 but one cannot imagine a
corporate employer "author" in quite the same way. The recognition
of authorship in such humble creations as circus advertisements
279
also serves to disassociate authorship from the higher forms of
genius.280 In copyright law, the romantic notion of authorship
maintains, at best, an uneasy coexistence with a less personal, more
272. See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM.
U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1988) ("The author is presumed to have an almost transcendental
insight-something which cuts beneath the mundane world of everyday appearance.").
273. Woodmansee, supra note 267, at 429.
274. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1867 (1990) ("[The] personality concept of copyright
continues-often subconsciously, but certainly pervasively-to inform our ideas about
copyright today....").
275. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of"Authorship,"
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 456 ("British and American copyright presents myriad reflections of the
Romantic conception of 'authorship'-even if they sometimes remind one of images in fun-
house mirrors."); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 873, 894 (1997) (arguing that romantic authorship may "affect[] decision-making
somewhere below the conscious level by incliningjudges and members of Congress to support
the 'author," but questioning its value as "an overarching theory explaining intellectual
property....").
276. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
277. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 737 (1989).
278. Jaszi, supra note 275, at 459 (referring to the Wordsworthian notion of authorship).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
280. See Jaszi, supra note 275, at 483.
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consumer-oriented model-a model in which the marketplace is the
arbiter of progress.
Literary theorists have also challenged the romantic model of
authorship. Roland Barthes announced the "death of the author" in
a famous essay concerning the interpretation of texts."' The
romantic model of authorship implies that a writing or a work of art
has a single true interpretation corresponding to the message that
the author/genius intended to convey. Barthes disputed that idea:
"We now know that a text is not a line of words releasing a single
'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the author-God) but a
multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash."2"2 Authorship, according to this "un-
romantic" point of view, is less a manifestation of the author's
personal vision, created ex nihilo, than it is a synthesis of prior texts
and cultural influences.' The text produced by such a synthesis is
not simply a communication from its creator; it is an object that
exists on its own terms, independent of its origins-a cultural
artifact. The meaning intended by the author is only one way to
understand such a text.'
Accordingly, recent critical analysis has seen decreased emphasis
on the author-genius and increased emphasis on the text. Professor
Peter Jaszi perceives a similar movement in copyright law, marked
by the displacement of the author in favor of the work."8 For
281. Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MuSIc-TEXT (Stephen Heath
trans., 1977).
282. Id. at 146 ("The text is a tissue drawn from the innumerable centers of culture.").
283. See Litman, supra note 4, at 966. Jessica Litman states:
To say that every new work is in some sense based on the works that preceded
it is such a truism that it has long been a clich6, invoked but not examined. But
the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.
Id. (footnote omitted).
284. From this point of view, the author, if not dead, is so diminished that writer and
reader are, in a sense, coequals. See Jaszi, supra note 275, at 458 n.9. "The 'text' may be
literary, visual, or aural (or any combination of these); whatever form it takes, it is created
not in the act of writing but in the act of reading. It 'asks of the reader a practical
collaboration.' Id. (quoting Roland Barthes, From Work to Text, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT, supra
note 281, at 163); see also Nimmer, supra note 17, at 167 ("Literary theory has moved beyond
the revelation from on-high of 'authority (the auctoritas of authorship)' to a realm in which
it is the interpretive community that constitutes the text, and the reader reigns supreme."
(footnotes omitted)).
285. See Jaszi, supra note 275, at 475 ("For many purposes, the 'work' displaced the'author'
as the central idea of copyright law, facilitating the redefinition of the boundary between
616 [Vol. 44:569
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example, publishers or others who obtain copyrights by assign-
ment rather than by authorship acquire "a general dominion over
the imaginative territory of a particular literary or artistic
production'--an imaginative territory defined by the charac-
teristics of the work rather than by the identity of its creator. Their
dominion can be exercised against authors, even the author of the
original work, if they trespass on the protected territory by
authoring similar or derivative works.2 7 In Jaszi's view, this
emphasis on the work, accompanied by the unwillingness of
courts to judge aesthetic merit,2" "both effaces and generalizes
'authorship,' leaving this category with little or no meaningful
content and none of its traditional associations." 9
Jaszi expresses misgivings about the dilution of "authorship,"'
typified by Alfred Bells 291 recognition of authorship by acci-
dent,292 and the commercialization of culture,293 facilitated by the
"democratized," nonjudgmental approach of Alfred Bell and
Bleistein.24 Yet in some ways the un-romantic, text-centered model
seems more in tune with the social benefits rationale said to be at
the heart of copyright. 5 The satisfaction of public needs-including
the need to "promote the progress" of knowledge-depends upon the
content of the works available to the public. It does not depend,
directly, on the circumstances of their creation. Whether a work
took great effort or no effort to produce, whether it is personal or
impersonal, whether it is the product of genius or incompetence is
of little consequence to the consuming public, however important it
proprietary control and free public access.").
286. Id. at 478.
287. See id.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
289. Jaszi, supra note 275, at 483.
290. See id. at 501 ("The prevailing view of'authorship' is often that which best serves the
immediate interests of copyright proprietors who distribute the works as commodities.").
291. See supra Part I.C.
292. See Jaszi, supra note 275, at 483-84.
293. See id. at 484-85 ("[Tjhese decisions [Bleistein andAlfred Bell] represent the last stage
in the commercialization of cultural production. Under Alfred Bell's 'minimalist' and
'democratized' vision of 'authorship,' copyright doctrine offers no sound basis for
distinguishing between oil paintings, art reproductions, motion pictures, lamp bases, poems,
and inflatable plastic Santa Clauses.").
294. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
295. See supra note 262.
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might be to the author. Genius, personality, and effort may produce
superior works, but it is the product that is important to society.29
C. The Role of "Originality"
Copyright doctrine defines authorship primarily in terms of
originality. As we have seen, an original work is one that is made,
as opposed to discovered or copied.' Whether originality requires
only that, or whether it also requires some form of intellectual
contribution to the making, is a question one must address in the
context of indeterminate works. In the leading cases on originality,
one finds abundant rhetorical support for the position that more is
required-some "work of the brain,"29 ' or "intellectual production ...
thought, and conception. ' If that is a correct reading of originality,
one should find a clear relationship between the "work of the brain"
requirement and the overall function played by originality in the
copyright scheme. In the spirit of inquiry, I offer the following as
some potential functions of the originality requirement. 3°0 Some
explain the originality requirement best in a context of authorial
natural rights; others match best with a social benefits model of
copyright.
296. If works of authorship are treated as objects, their value determined by the operations
of the marketplace, one may fear that art will become too commercialized and the tastes of
the masses substituted for genuine progress. On the other hand, any system designed to
promote the progress of knowledge by exclusive rights, the value of which depends upon
consumer demand, necessarily defers to the marketplace to decide what does or does not
constitute "progress."
297. See supra Parts I.A. & I.B.
298. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
299. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884).
300. One explanation of the originality requirement is that it matches the likely
expectations of those who drafted the Constitution. In the Supreme Court's view, the term
"author," as employed in the Constitution, implies originality. See Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,346 (1991). If original means "not copied," the conclusion is
a reasonable one; probably the Framers distinguished between authorship and copying as
readily as we do. Searching for the Framers' intent cannot, however, take us very far towards
answering questions that they probably never thought to pose, such as whether an
indeterminate work could qualify as the writing of an author. Perhaps the best we can do is
to keep in mind their expressed objective: "to promote the Progress of Science [i.e.,
knowledge]." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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1. Diversity of Expression
Copyright law has no novelty requirement, as any treatise will
confirm." 1 A poet who miraculously reproduces Ode on a Grecian
Urn, innocent of any knowledge of Keats, can in theory obtain a
copyright, even though there is nothing new about the poem. 02 The
crucial fact imposed by the originality requirement is the absence of
copying. Except, however, in the case of works so simple that
expression and idea merge," every author who does not slavishly
copy from another source is likely to introduce something unique."'
The prohibition on copying, therefore, serves as a gentle nudge in
the direction of novelty, ensuring the public a more diverse selection
of works than would be the case if copied works were copyrightable.
The creativity requirement, which Feist identified as a component
of originality,' 5 also hints at novelty. Feist determined that Rural's
white pages telephone directory lacked creativity because the
organization was "entirely typical" and "garden-variety," "°c "an age-
old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it
has come to be expected as a matter of course"37--all rhetoric
consistent with a novelty threshold. On the other hand, as pre-
viously discussed, the Court may simply have inferred from the
typicality of the organization that it must have been copied."
Therefore, the "creativity" component of originality could be
primarily a reaffirmation or corollary of the copying prohibition.
3
09
301. See, e.g., NIMMm, supra note 87, at § 2.01[A).
302. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
303. Because facts and ideas are not subject to copyright, if those facts or ideas can be
expressed in only a small number of ways even the expression is unprotectable.
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic
necessarily requires," if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by
copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities ... of the
substance.
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (citations omitted); see
Durham, supra note 21, at 801.
304. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("[A] very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone.").
305. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
306. Id. at 362.
307. Id. at 363.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
309. Although Rural did not copy its directory from another source, one could view the
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2. Identification
Original works bear an individual stamp3 1 -an author's
"trademark," so to speak-which helps to identify the source of the
work. This can be important in establishing infringement, which
requires evidence of copying."' If an admirer of a public domain
novel could copy it verbatim and then copyright the result, it would
be difficult to determine if an accused infringer had copied from the
copy or from the original; in either case, the accused work would
look the same. Similar problems would arise if one could copyright
facts copied from the world-i.e., determined by research."a It might
be difficult to determine if the same facts appeared in an accused
work because they had been copied, or because they had been re-
discovered through the accused infringer's own research. If
copyright is limited to original works, similarities between the
copyrighted work and the accused work have greater significance as
evidence of infringement. Useful as this may be, however, there is
little to suggest that it is the ultimate purpose of the originality
requirement."'
directory as merely the union of facts copied from the world and an organizational scheme
copied from numerous prior works. Even if, in the strictest sense, the combination was new,
copyright protection would raise issues of merger. See supra note 115.
310. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350 (i[Clopyright is limited to those aspects of the
work-termed 'expression'-that display the stamp of the author's originality.') (quoting
Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)); Ginsburg, supra note 274, at
1881-82 (discussing the notion that each work of expression is a singular reflection of the
author's unique personality).
311. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Proof of copying is crucial to any
claim of copyright infringement because no matter how similar the two works may be (even
to the point of identity), if the defendant did not copy the accused work, there is no
infringement.").
312. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection
of Nonfiction Works, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 516, 525 (1981).
313. In Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983), Judge Posner advocated
a high standard of originality for derivative works in order to alleviate confusion as to the
source of the allegedly infringing work. "Mhe purpose of the term ['original] in copyright law
is not to guide aesthetic judgments but to assure a sufficiently gross difference between the
underlying and the derivative work to avoid entangling subsequent artists depicting the
underlying work in copyright problems." Id. at 305.
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3. Natural Rights
The originality requirement may ensure that the potential
copyright owner deserves exclusivity as a matter of natural right. It
may ensure, for example, that the author invested labor, because
devising an original work is likely to require greater effort than
copying. But originality is a poor measure of labor. A work that is
"unoriginal" because "copied from the world" may reflect much more
labor than an "original" work of modest ambitions. Possibly all labor
is not the same and those whose labor is "creative" have stronger
moral claims to compensation, but it is difficult to justify such
a distinction if labor, per se, is really the issue. In any event,
something more than labor-based entitlement is necessary to
explain the Supreme Court's conception of originality as the
"bedrock principle of copyright."31 ' In spite of its requirement of "a
modicum of intellectual labor,"315 the Court soundly rejected "sweat
of the brow" as the principle justifying ownership.316
Alternatively, originality may ensure the presence of the author's
personality in the work. A faithful copy reflects nothing of the
copier's personality, whereas an original work, however humble,
reflects "the personal reaction of [the] individual upon nature."3 17 If
copyright law existed primarily to protect the personality, privacy,
or "personhood" of authors, this might explain why originality is the
bedrock principle of copyright. On the other hand, if it is true that
the primary justification for copyright is the benefit conferred on the
consuming public, 31 the originality requirement should bear a
closer relationship to societal interests than to individual interests.
Protecting "the personal reaction of the individual" should be a
means to an end, not the end itself.
4. Defining the Commons
I have saved for last the point that I believe comes closest to
explaining why there is an originality requirement and why it is
314. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 352-53.
317. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
318. See supra note 262.
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such an essential principle of copyright. Locke qualified his theory
of ownership with the proviso that "enough and as good" be left
in the commons for others to enjoy.319 Copyright law exhibits a
similar and necessary concern for the exhaustion of resources.320
Facts and ideas are uncopyrightable, and, as far as copyright law
is concerned, belong to the commons. An author's individual
expression, embodying an idea or communicating a fact, is copy-
rightable, so long as a multitude of other potential expressions are
available. If there is only one way, or a few ways, to express an idea
or to communicate a fact, so that exclusive rights to the expression
would effectively preempt the idea or the fact, then "merger" is said
to apply and the expression is uncopyrightable.321
In most cases, one can imagine expression as an inexhaustible
resource. Historians, for example, can describe the same event (e.g.,
the sinking of the Titanic) and communicate the same facts (1,513
lives were lost) without ever choosing precisely the same words.
Copyright law encourages such diversity by allowing facts to be
duplicated but not expression. More unique works are produced and
progress marches on.322 "Copied" material is, generally speaking, a
more limited resource. There may be other shipwrecks to describe,
or other facts about the Titanic to recount, but they are not
substitutes. Hence, if the first author to describe the loss of life
on the Titanic were the last permitted to do so (until the first
author's copyright had expired), the "progress" of knowledge might
be hindered more than abetted. The originality requirement seems
to reflect the distinction between the inexhaustible and the finite,
particularly when, as in Feist, it is applied in the context of material
"copied from the world."
Perhaps this is not the whole story. If it is true that every
snowflake differs from every other, one might run out of words to
describe snowflakes before one ran out of snowflakes to describe.323
319. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
320. See Gordon, supra note 227, at 1581-82 (linking prohibitions on the ownership of
abstract ideas with Locke's "proviso").
321. See supra note 129.
322. See Litman, supra note 4, at 968 ("The public domain should be understood not as the
realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of
the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.").
323. If, that is, one considered one snowflake as good as another-a position that the very
uniqueness of snowflakes seems to contradict.
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Further, if facts were copyrightable but infringement limited to
copying the facts, the possibility of rediscovering the facts through
independent research would make the facts, in some sense,
inexhaustible.3 2' Such inconsistencies are reduced if one regards
facts not only as a more finite resource than expression, but as a
more essential component of the public domain. Speaking in broad
terms, facts concern the world in which we all live; hence our
freedom to share, discuss, and build upon facts is perhaps more
important to the progress of knowledge than the freedom to share,
discuss, or build upon something as personal as the expression of a
particular author.325 The balance that best satisfies the consti-
tutional mandate may be that which favors incentive in the case of
expression, but access in the case of discoveries. Hazards do exist,
of course, in attempting to draw such distinctions. 26 Still, the
concern for diversity of expression and free access to the universal
seems nearest to what Feist had in mind in discussing originality,
and nearest to the explicit constitutional purpose of copyright-
promoting the advancement of knowledge for the ultimate benefit
of the public.
IV. SEEKING AUTHORSHIP IN INDETERMINATE WORKS
In this Part, I consider whether indeterminacy and authorship
are compatible, focusing on indeterminate or quasi-indeterminate
works of the following kinds: (1) works discovered by the would-be
324. Referring to ownership of ideas, which like facts are uncopyrightable apart from their
particular expression, Professor Gordon states, "[ilt might be supposed that one way to satisfy
[Locke's] proviso while still giving ownership in ideas would be to restrict owners' exclusive
rights to control copying, and give owners no rights against persons who independently
happen to recreate or rediscover the idea;" yet she concludes that "[oJnce put into the cultural
stream by an initial creative person," certain ideas are irretrievable, because any other result
"could close off some of the best opportunities otherwise open to others." Gordon, supra note
227, at 1581-82; see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930)
("Though the plaintiff discovered the vein [of ideas], she could not keep it to herself .... ").
Feist's approach to facts, perhaps by similar reasoning, not only preserves the commons but
improves access to the commons by forced contribution; once a discovery has been reported
in a work of authorship, others are relieved of the effort of duplicative research.
325. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) ("The
law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.").
326. For example, it may be difficult to distinguish between universal fact and individual
opinion. See Durham, supra note 21, at 838-42.
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author after they already exist; 2 7 (2) works that owe their existence
to the author, but whose form is determined, to a greater or lesser
degree, by forces beyond the author's control; and (3) works that
may appear random, but whose form is determined by the author,
either consciously or unconsciously. I will begin by revisiting the
hypotheticals first seen in the introduction."' 8
A. Hypotheticals
1. Artist A
Artist A discovered her abstract masterpiece on the floor of
a hardware store, where generations of customers had dripped
paint. Artist A purchased that section of the floor, hung it in her
gallery, and claimed the rights usually reserved to authors. Her
case resembles that of the unsteady draftsman hypothesized in
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,329 with the difference
that Artist A had no physical role in the creation of the work she
"adopted."
Although one would be hard pressed to find any authority for
deeming Artist A the author of the work, from a theoretical
perspective she might advance a claim. If authorship requires
"intellectual labor,"30 Artist A could point to the mental effort and
imagination necessary to recognize the aesthetic merits of the
piece-merits evidently overlooked by other patrons of the hardware
store. In Lockean terms, she "improved the commons" by singling
out this section of floor as one with expressive potential. Artist A's
claim to a personality or "personhood" interest is equally plausible.
Her selection reflects her tastes and proclaims her individual vision;
this work might be her most prized, and, in a sense, most personal
331possession. Finally, applying the more utilitarian consumer-
327. Such works are "indeterminate" in the sense that the "author" is not responsible for
their form.
328. See 8upra text accompanying notes 14-15.
329. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
330. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
331. See Radin, supra note 250, at 987 (remarking that a hierarchy of property interests
based on "personhood" "focuses on the person with whom [the thing] ends up--on an internal
quality in the holder or a subjective relationship between the holder and the thing, and not
on the objective arrangements surrounding production of the thing").
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oriented criteria that copyright law favors, one could argue that
awarding Artist A exclusive rights would promote the progress of
the arts. Perhaps her discoveries are turned into prints that
regularly outsell Jackson Pollock's. If exclusive rights belong to
Artist A, she will have the financial incentive to visit more
hardware stores, her eyes open to the possibilities of art.
What Artist A cannot claim is a role in the physical creation
of the work. One could argue that, in an abstract sense, the work
was created when Artist A saw the potential in it; without her
intervention, it would have been a soundless tree falling in a
metaphorical forest. After all, copyright is not about ownership of
the physical medium-whether paper, celluloid, canvas, or, in this
case, linoleum-it is about ownership of an abstraction, which might
be said to exist only when it is perceived.33 2 The problem lies in the
lengths to which one might take such an argument. If appreciation
or selection is the key, every flower in a meadow or galaxy in the sky
is a potentially copyrightable work. Feist's dichotomy of creation
and discoveryM3 prevents an overbroad conception of authorship. It
keeps copyright within reasonable bounds, forestalling the erosion
of the commons and improving access. Human imagination may be
limitless, but the discoverable world, including hardware stores, is
finite.
One must also consider the potential claims of those who actually
dripped the paint, ignorant of their contributions to art. If author-
ship and discovery mingle, questions of competing claims inevitably
arise. If Artist A had found her masterpiece on the easel of an
obscure painter (Artist 0) rather than on the floor of a hardware
store, her theoretical claims of authorship could be much the
same: she still used her imagination, exercised her personality,
and advanced the "progress" of art by bringing an unknown work to
the attention of the public. Yet, even if Artist A's theoretical
justifications for a property interest were similar to those of an
author, Artist 0 would still contend, and probably everyone would
agree, that Artist 0, not Artist A, is the author of the work.
332. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 99 (discussing the "ftmdamental distinction" between
the copyrighted work and "the material object in which it is embodied," as recognized in the
legislative history of the Copyright Act).
333. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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On the other hand, in this case Artist A is unlikely to face such
competing claims; she can reasonably demand exclusive credit for
a potentially valuable work. Moreover, unlike a flower or a galaxy,
her work at least resembles, and may be indistinguishable from,
works that are routinely afforded copyright protection. She might
still ask: Should the law care, if the consuming public does not, how
the work came about?
2. Artist B
If Artist A is reminiscent of Duchamp and his "ready-mades,"334
Artist B, who achieved his masterpiece by tossing buckets of paint
into the air, is reminiscent of Jackson Pollock. We can assume for
purposes of the hypothetical that Artist B's work looks just like
Artist A's. 335 Artist B should have little difficulty in convincing a
court that his work is a "work of authorship." In literal terms, Artist
B, who physically caused the work to exist, is the "maker"336 of the
work. Even if his technique produces unpredictable results, the
work is still, to a degree, under Artist B's control. Artist B chose the
canvas and the paint, directed the paint in the general direction of
the canvas, and decided when the work was finished. Perhaps his
control was not complete, but such is the nature of his method.
Paint runs and drips even when applied by a brush.337
Artist B can also select a particular work as a success, perhaps
after rejecting a multitude of failures. Such selection, or weeding
out, is a typical component of authorship, comparable to what
writers and filmmakers do in the process of editing.338 Yet, post hoc
334. See supra text accompanying note 182.
335. This would not prevent either from being considered "original." See supra notes 302-03
and accompanying text.
336. See supra text accompanying note 57.
337. Serendipity often plays a role in art. Ansel Adams' famous Moonrise image, for
example, could only be captured because of Adams' technical facility, quick thinking, and good
fortune to be present just as nature presented an unusual photographic opportunity. See
ANSEL ADAMS, EXAMPLES: THE MAKING OF 40 PHOTOGRAPHS 41-43 (1983).
338. Even an abridgement of an existing work may be considered a copyrightable work of
authorship, assuming that the abridger had the right to use the original and that the
abridgement involves a minimal degree of creativity.
Compilations and abridgments may also be copyrightable if they contain new
work of authorship. When the collecting of the preexisting material that makes
up the compilation is a purely mechanical task with no element of editorial
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selection is close to "discovery." To distinguish himself from Artist
A, Artist B would have to rely primarily on other factors, such as his
physical involvement in the creation of the work or the limited
control he exercised.3 9
3. Artist C
Artist C is far more meticulous than Artist B in terms of
technique; he controls the location of every dab of paint. Yet the
process is as mechanical as the faithful completion of a paint-by-
the-numbers landscape. All of the aesthetic decisions are made
for Artist C by the roll of the dice. Unless one accepts the mystical
notion that divine or subconscious forces speak through the
operation of chance,"4 Artist C's method seems inconsistent with
the romantic ideal of the author/genius. If Artist C takes things
to Cage-inspired extremes, even the color of the paint and the
dimensions of the canvas will have been determined by random
processes. Surely no "message" can be conveyed when everything is
random.
Yet before one.dismisses the romantic ideal entirely, it is worth
considering the respect that an artist like Cage can command, as
suggested by the number of books devoted to his ideas. Even if
Cage's random works are intrinsically devoid of a message, which
seems to have been Cage's intention, 41 his system of composition
itself may convey meaning. If, for example, 4'33" is as empty a
selection, or when only a few minor deletions constitute an abridgment,
copyright protection for the compilation or abridgment as a new version is not
available.
Copyright Office General Information and Basics of Registration § 21.01, reprinted in
NIMMER, supra note 87, at § 5:21.01[Hi.
339. Professor Russ VerSteeg believes that communication is the essential component of
authorship. See Russ VerSteeg, Defining "Author"forPurposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1323, 1339 (1996). He does not, however, conclude that a mental image must precede the
physical creation of the work.
When a pop artist throws paint at a canvas, he does not necessarily picture in
his mind what the expression will look like after the paint settles. Nevertheless,
his failure to conceptualize the expression mentally before its physical creation
does not prevent the work from being copyrightable, nor does it prevent him
from being an author.
Id. at 1340.
340. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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composition as could possibly be contrived, the fact of its
composition and performance is thought provoking. Cage evidently
had a message to convey about the idea of composition.342 Similarly,
Artist C's explorations of technique might themselves qualify
him as a "genius." On the other hand, devising a system is not nec-
essarily the same as "authoring" the work produced by that system.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act distinguishes between a
copyrightable work of authorship and an uncopyrightable "idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery."" We can, in any case, hypothesize that the system
used by Artist C was devised by someone else.
If we assume that Artist C's role is purely mechanical, his
Lockean claims would be based on physical labor, and perhaps
mental concentration, but not on any higher or more creative form
of intellectual effort.3" His personality interest would be nil, except
to the extent of any post hoc "adoption" of the work, similar to what
we hypothesized for Artist A. Invoking the public benefits point of
view, however, Artist C can claim sole responsibility for the
existence of a work that the public, potentially, finds valuable. The
work may look like one produced by more conventional means, and
it may even bear similar meaning, if meaning is what an audience
finds in a work, as opposed to what its creator intends.3' Artist C's
role in the creation of the work may differ from that of a traditional
342. See Dan Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 769, 804 (1984) ("The decision] to allow chance to decide [the form of a musical
composition] is itself an artistic decision--one that is no less deserving of copyright protection
in principle or in conformity with the Act.").
343. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
344; Discussing Locke, Professor Gordon argues:
Aimless effort is not labor. Appropriative labor involves altering what was in the
common in a way that makes it usable and thus more valuable to humanity....
Most important from the perspective of the laborer's claim, however, is the
laborer's purposiveness. A stranger's taking of another's labored-on objects is
likely to merit legal intervention only if the taking interferes with a goal or
project to which the laborer has purposely directed her effort.
Gordon, supra note 227, at 1547 (footnotes omitted). Even if this is true, Artist C could reply
that his efforts are purposeful, as intended to produce a desirable work of art. Chance is
merely a tool for achieving that purpose.
345. Professor VerSteeg states that "loin the most elementary level, a copyright author is
a communicator." VerSteeg, supra note 339, at 1339. Perhaps it would be more in line with
contemporary thought to say that an author is the creator of that which communicates. See
generally supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
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painter, but the same could be said of an employer who is treated as
the "author" of a work-made-for-hire. s "
There is still the question of whether Artist C's creation is
"original." Unlike Artist A, Artist C is responsible for the physical
existence of the work. He is a "maker" in that sense, whether one
considers the system a tool employed by Artist C or Artist C a tool
employed by the system. Artist C's work is not copied from another
work. In fact, if his system is sufficiently complex, the random
element itself promotes a unique, unpredictable, unprecedented
result. 47 What may be lacking is the. right kind of mental en-
gagement by Artist C, who in that respect is more like a slavish
copier than a creative genius. The origin of the work is in Artist C's
labor, not in his mind. Yet Artist C might argue that romantic
notions of authorial creativity are outmoded and inappropriate to a
public-benefits oriented copyright law. It is the work, he might say,
that counts.
4. Artist D
Artist D, who heeds her subconscious urges, seems an easy case.
Instinct, emotion, daydreams, and nightmares are such ubiquitous
sources of creativity, authorship can by no means be limited to what
is conscious and calculated.3 Although one could, perhaps, demand
a minimum of deliberate control or conscious oversight, denying
copyright to a hypothetical artist who paints in her sleep, it is
difficult to see what goal would be served. The subconscious mind
is as much a part of the individual as the conscious mind, and the
products of the subconscious may be compelling. Coleridge's dream-
composed Xanadu is as worthy of copyright as any other poem."'
346. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
347. If Artist C's system produced an inevitable, non-random result, it might be
appropriate to consider the "expression" merged with the system, as idea and expression
merge when the alternatives are few. See supra note 129.
348. Novelists often say that their characters seem to determine their own fates. See JOHN
FOWLES, THE FRENCH LiEUTENANsWoMAN 96-97 (1969) ("It is only when our characters and
events begin to disobey us that they begin to live."); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright as
Myth, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 235, 244-45 (1991).
349. The poem apparently came to Coleridge in a dream:
The Author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the
external senses, during which time he has the most vivid confidence, that he
could not have composed less than from two to three hundred lines; if that
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The random numbers cases, such as Toro35° and Mitel,51 suggest
that a work lacking "rhyme or reason" fails the test of originality.
This could be interpreted in several ways. It could mean that order
or meaning must be present in the work and evident to the
viewer-a test that Artist D's work, and a substantial amount of
modern art, is likely to fail. In the context of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court observed that "a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if
confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message,' would
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll.""2 Copyright law also disfavors tests that require a work to
communicate a message. As the Court said in Bleistein, "some works
of genius would be sure to miss appreciation" because "[tiheir very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the
new language in which their author spoke."353
Alternatively, the "rhyme or reason" test could require an order
consciously imposed on the work, even if not evident to the viewer.
Works with private meaning would qualify as "original works of
authorship;" works without consciously intended meaning would
fail. This test might suffice for numbering schemes, where any
meaning is likely to be of the consciously rational rather than the
subconsciously expressive variety, but it does not match well with
works of art, like Artist D's. The subconscious is too important a
part of creativity to be banished from the realm of authorship.
One could broaden the test, simply requiring that the work
possess "meaning" of some kind, whatever its source. This would
be a difficult test to apply, given the elusive nature of meaning.
One would also wonder how to treat works that exhibit "rhyme or
indeed can be called composition in which all the images rose up before him as
things, with a parallel production of the correspondent expressions, without any
sensation or consciousness of effort.
1 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS 295-96 (Ernest Hartley
Coleridge ed., 1912).
350. Toro Co. v. RiR Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 114-33
and accompanying text.
351. Mitel, Inc. v. Igtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); see supra notes 134-42 and
accompanying text.
352. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (citations omitted).
353. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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reason," but not as a consequence of human decision making. Artist
C's work, for example, could be guided by mathematical equations
rather than by chance. Such a work would be equally devoid of
intellectual contribution, conscious or subconscious, and any
"expression" could be said to have merged with the process, given
the inevitability of the result. Yet, seemingly, the Toro and Mitel
courts would be more receptive to the calculated work than they
would be to Artist D's creativity, at least if their reasoning extends
beyond simple numbering schemes. 4
B. The Random Muse
If it is true, as the courts have insisted, that the purpose of
copyright is primarily to benefit the public rather than to defend
the natural rights of authors,35 and if it is also true, as I have
suggested myself,"6 that the purpose of the originality requirement
is primarily to preserve, enhance, and define the commons, one
should not accept too hastily the conclusion that indeterminate
works are uncopyrightable. In fact, indeterminate works have much
in common with works shaped by the freest exercise of an author's
imagination.
To illustrate this point, I will offer a rather extreme example.
One can access a website that allows visitors to "compose" their
354. Focusing on abstract paintings, as I have in the hypotheticals, may prompt an unfairly
broad conception of authorship. Many people would feel unqualified to judge modern art or
to draw any conclusions about the occult sources of an artist's creativity. Sometimes it seems
that the only rule for the avant-garde is "anything goes"-an impression that experiments like
Duchamp's "ready-mades" or Cage's 4'33" may reinforce. But the subject-matter scope of
copyright is so vast that copyright principles must embrace both high and low art. The cases
discussing the status of indeterminate works, like Toro and Mitel, deal with some of the least
impressive, least intimidating works on the spectrum of expression. Anyone could devise a
random list of parts numbers or haphazardly assign code numbers to the functions of a
telephone system. Perhaps we can more confidently dismiss such works as not what we mean
by "works of authorship." We should not, however, confuse our comparatively low regard for
such works in general with our attitude toward indeterminacy. If randomly-generated parts
numbers seem too trivial to bear the weight of the term "works of authorship," is it because
they are randomly-generated or because they are parts numbers? If the numbers in Toro had
meant something, would their status be transformed? Although I can agree with the result
in these cases, I cannot see that the result depends on whether the numbers were randomly-
generated or, for example, devised by some irrelevant but "creative" system of numerology
which only seems entirely random.
355. See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
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own music according to the rules of Mozart's Musikalisches
WUrfelspiel,"7 using a randomizing computer program in place of
the customary pair of dice.3"' If I were to visit that site and, by
clicking on the button provided, generate my own "compositions," it
is unlikely that either the courts or the Copyright Office would
consider those compositions "original works of authorship," even if
someone saw fit to reproduce them without my authority. There
would be no "work of the brain" or "creativity" involved-at least not
on my part. Yet it is difficult to justify less favorable treatment of
my random compositions than others I deliberately pieced together.
On the contrary, the lack of design inherent in the random
compositions could justify broader rights.
We can assume that the random compositions have some value,
either because I happened upon unusually pleasing combinations
or because the public, for whatever reason, appreciates my un-
distinguished efforts. In any case, if the compositions have little
value, the imposition of exclusive rights is small in proportion.359 We
can further assume that exclusive rights would encourage me to
invest more time and effort in generating the compositions. Without
such reward, I would direct my energies elsewhere and the public
would be denied works it evidently desires. So far, there is little
reason to distinguish between these compositions and my more
conventional efforts; in either case, exclusive rights would "promote
357. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
358. We will assume that the results are actually random, even though computer programs,
unassisted, produce only pseudo-random numbers that seem random but, which are generated
by deterministic mathematical processes. See Johnson, supra note 224.
359. Professor Jaszi observes that "[sleemingly, at least, the goals of the law and
economics' theory might be well served by awarding copyright protection liberally and
allowing worthy artistic productions to prove their claims over inferior ones in the
marketplace." Jaszi, supra note 275, at 462 n.20. The objection can be made that rights too
liberally granted may inhibit authors, to the extent that borrowing or allusion is an aspect of
authorship. See id. That may be true, but there is no reason to think that it is particularly
true of indeterminate works. On the contrary, one suspects that curtailing allusion to
randomly-generated works would be less inhibiting than the same limitation applied to more
traditional works.
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the progress" of the arts.' ° But how can these works be deemed
"original?"
One way to think of originality is as an antidote to merger, either
of idea and expression or of fact and expression. Because they are
universal and finite, facts and ideas are committed to private
ownership only reluctantly,wi and never in the context of copyright.
Unimpeded access to facts and ideas is too critical to the
advancement of knowledge. Original expression is the personal
element that an author, borrowing Locke's image, "mixes" with the
universal to produce something capable of ownership. As long as the
facts or ideas can be expressed by others in their own fashion, the
facts and ideas remain in the commons, unexhausted and
inexhaustible.
In works that are indeterminate in a random fashion, the kind of
works that the courts seem most reluctant to consider original, the
random element serves as a counterpart, in many respects, to the
personal element contributed by an author's imagination. As long
as they are generated by a system of moderate complexity, random
works are essentially unique. A new Musikalisches Wurfelspiel
composition is no more likely to duplicate a prior composition than
a new poem is likely to duplicate Keats; perhaps less so, to the
extent that Keats' idea is capable of a limited range of expression.
Repetition is so improbable that no one could reasonably claim to
have generated my compositions independently. 2 More impor-
tantly, other would-be composers could create their own pseudo-
Mozart compositions without my copyrights impeding their efforts.
Access to the universal, in the form of Mozart's idea, is unaffected.
To be sure, the vagaries of randomness are not "expression" in the
ordinary sense, because they do not convey any message formed
by my intellect; but if the purposes of originality are as I have
described, random compositions are, in some ways, superior to
360. Patent law, which derives its authority from the constitutional directive "[t]o
promote the Progress of... useful Arts," U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, does not require that the
invention be devised through any particular thought process, so long as the result is new,
useful, and non-obvious. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) ("Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made.').
361. Patent law, in a sense, permits ideas to become property, but only when those ideas
are applied in specific, useful applications. See Diamondv. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981).
Even then, rights are relatively short lived and difficult to obtain.
362. See supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
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expressive compositions in terms of their suitability for copyright.
Conventional works, which are creative but not random, stray closer
to merger; "rhyme or reason" is more universal, closer to a fact or
idea, than pure chance. The more ordered a work is--one could even
say, the more meaningful a work is-the greater the threat that
exclusive rights to a particular form of expression will preempt
uncopyrightable facts or ideas. Perhaps the most original works are
those least constrained by design, even to the point of having no
design whatsoever.
In his seminal work on information theory, mathematician
Claude Shannon proposed that the information in a message is
proportional to its disorder.' One could conceive of authorship and
disorder, or originality and disorder, as equally interdependent. If
the author-as-genius is truly dead,"' perhaps we should cry, in the
context of copyright at least, "long live anarchy!"
C. Suggestions
Having approached the edge of that theoretical abyss, it is time
for an orderly retreat. One cannot eliminate the conventional notion
of authorship as a purposeful, intellectual activity without leaving
something in its place; fair interpretation of the Constitution and
the Copyright Act, if not common sense, requires some limitations
on the subject matter of copyright. Randomness is everywhere in
nature, but surely "authorship" is not.
To begin with, a work of authorship has to be made, not dis-
covered, by a human being." One could argue that the only differ-
ence between discovering something already in existence (e.g., a
hitherto unknown bird song) and discovering something produced
by an indeterminate process (e.g., a minuet produced by Mozart's
dice game) is one of timing, but at least the latter owes its existence,
if not its form, to human intervention.3 It can reasonably fit within
363. See CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF
COMMUNICATION 103 (1963) (-The quantity which uniquely meets the natural requirements
that one sets up for information turns out to be exactly that which is known in
thermodynamics as entropy.*).
364. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
365. See supra text accompanying note 80.
366. Cf Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) ("[T]hese bits
of information are uncopyrightable facts; they existed before Rural reported them and would
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a broad definition of "authorship," and it makes sense to think of
copyright as an incentive to generate such works. Human respon-
sibility for the existence of an object is not, however, sufficient to
make that object a "work of authorship" for purposes of copyright.
Human beings create many things, from thumbprints, to machines,
to plates of spaghetti. Copyright law was never intended to be a
grand unified theory of property, encompassing everything made by
the hand of man. If it were, copyrights would probably expire sooner
and be more difficult to obtain. Copyright only applies to "writings."
If "writings" are not defined by their intellectual origins, they
must be defined by some inherent characteristic-something that
distinguishes the work of art from the heap of pasta. One approach
is to limit copyright to the kinds of works that Congress has already
identified as "works of authorship" in § 102 of the Copyright
Act 367-literary works, musical works, dramatic works, and so forth.
This would suffice in many cases. One could protect a poem, for
example, whether it was written by conventional means or by a
process that the author did little or nothing to control. This
approach would expand, slightly, the scope of copyrightable subject
matter, but it would hardly be revolutionary in effect. There are at
least two objections. First, in some cases it might be difficult to
decide if a work legitimately belonged in a traditional category.
"Sculptural work," for example, could potentially embrace any three-
dimensional object created by a human being. This vagueness
already exists-a chef might claim his plate of spaghetti as an
expression of his artistic vision-but it would perhaps be
exacerbated if the intellectual component were made irrelevant.
Second, the categories listed in § 102 are not meant to be
exclusive.' "Works of authorship" should be defined in a manner
that allows room for expansion, as well as justification for the
categories already explicit.
Instead, one could categorize as "writings" and "works of author-
ship" those human creations that have an aesthetic or "expressive"
quality, judged from the perspective of the audience. Even objects
have continued to exist if Rural had never published a telephone directory.").
367. The term "works of authorship," however, has been construed as a narrower category
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shaped by chance may be perceived as beautiful or meaningful. But
here too there are difficulties. Expressive qualities may be difficult
to find in untalented or utilitarian works, both of which are
copyrightable. Worse, they may be found, by a willing audience, in
nearly anything, returning us to the situation in which anything
made by a person could be considered a "work of authorship."
Perhaps the best argument for defining "works of authorship"
according to their intellectual origins is the lack of any clearly
superior alternative. Also, terms such as "author," "writing," and
"expression," suggest an expectation by Congress, as well as by the
Framers, that the works subject to copyright would be works of
imagination, mental exertion, and the purposeful communication of
ideas. Regardless of the tension between conventional notions of
authorship and the public benefits emphasis of copyright, I would
not, therefore, advocate any radical changes in the subject matter
scope of copyright. On the other hand, I do suggest greater recog-
nition of indeterminacy as an aspect of authorship, at least under
the following circumstances: where the "work" is (1) made by a
human being, directly or indirectly; (2) similar in kind to works
ordinarily given copyright protection, and (3) subject to the "creative
control" of that human being, in a manner I will explain.
Condition (1) preserves the basic distinction between creation and
discovery. It would mean that Artist A could not copyright the
pattern she found on someone else's floor, though she could, without
violating this condition, copyright a pattern she found on her own
floor, where she had dripped her own paint. The distinction may be
difficult to defend on policy grounds, but lines must be drawn
somewhere. If recognizing the expressive potential in an existing
object were to be considered "authorship"-blurring to a consid-
erable degree the acts of creation and consumption-the nexus
between the individual and the work would be so weakened that it
would often be difficult to determine who, among all those who
appreciate the object, should be considered the "author." Moreover,
the requirement that an author be involved in the creation of the
work preserves the notion of a natural commons. By "made ...
indirectly" I include situations where the author employs an
external agency, which could include a power tool, a computer
program, the force of gravity, a trained staff of assistants, or a
tumbling pair of dice. Any such agency introduces an element
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beyond the control of the author, but it is sufficient to satisfy
condition (1) that the author is ultimately responsible for the work
being made.
369
Condition (2), which requires that the work be similar in kind to
works that are usually recognized as copyrightable, is a safeguard
against unchecked expansion of copyrightable subject matter.
Suppose, for example, that a breeder attempted to copyright a new
type of parakeet. Although the breeder might be responsible,
indirectly, for the existence of the bird and its progeny, it is unlikely
that a court would consider a parakeet an original work of
authorship or a writing, even if the breeder managed to emphasize
certain features expressing his conception of avian beauty. Certainly
caution is in order, given the significant differences between a living
creature and the traditional vehicles of expression listed in § 102 of
the Copyright Act, not to mention what the Framers of the
Constitution might have approved. Even if breeders should have
their due, the balances struck in copyright law may not be
appropriate to the task. To the extent that de-emphasizing the role
of intention in authorship distances copyright from its traditional
roots, adherence to previously recognized categories of copyrightable
subject matter seems advisable. However, in most cases, in-
determinate works could be grouped with the traditionally crafted
works that they resemble-musical compositions, paintings, poetry,
and so forth.
Condition (3) calls for a minimal exercise of "creative control" by
the author. By "creative control," I refer to choices made by the
author that are reflected in the form of the work. These choices
might be made before the fact, as when John Cage established the
rules of one of his indeterminate systems, based on star atlases or
the I Ching, only to let chance take over in determining the ultimate
form of the composition.37 Or the choices might be made after the
fact, as when the author edits the product of an indeterminate
369. Questions of proximate cause might arise. The landlord who rented property to the
owners of the hardware store might claim that in drafting the lease agreement he, in some
sense, "caused" the paint-splatter masterpiece to exist. The problem is real, but should largely
be taken care of by condition (3).
370. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
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process, or selects from various alternatives, as Jean Arp may well
have done in producing his indeterminate collages.37 '
If one could accept without qualification the idea that copyright
exists for the benefit of the public, rather than authors, and that
"originality" is primarily concerned with the commons, 7 condition
(3) might be discarded. One could be satisfied as long as the author
made the work, and it resembles in form a traditional mode of
expression. Even if "authorship" or "originality" require intellectual
labor-imagination, purpose, or "work of the brain'--it can be found
in most, if not all, seemingly indeterminate works. Creativity can
coexist with indeterminacy, and a mixture is probably the rule in
authorship, rather than the exception.
The most problematic case is that of the simple "adoption" posited
in Alfred Bell, where the result is unintended and no editing or
selection takes place. 73 But even here one could argue, and a
court might find, that the "adoption" was a purposeful, imaginative,
"creative" act.
D. Caveats
Although I believe that indeterminate works can be "works of
authorship," at least under the limited circumstances outlined
above, certain qualifications or caveats must be noted.
1. Systems
When indeterminate works are generated by some kind of
system-like the systems that John Cage employed in generating
his compositions 374-authorial rights should not be so broad that
other uses of the system are preempted. "Systems," like "ideas," are
uncopyrightable 5 In some cases it may be difficult to distinguish
between the system and the product of the system, particularly
when the author's creativity is expressed in the former. If my genius
lies in devising a compositional system that yields unpredictable but
371. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Part III.C.4.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
374. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
375. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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distinctive results, any other works produced by my system
might be considered substantially similar and an intrusion on my
exclusive rights.376 Perhaps the solution here would be to recognize
a continuum between "system" and "expression" similar to that
between "idea" and "expression," which would permit other uses of
broadly similar, if not identical, systems.377 Of course, such issues
would only arise where the author who used the system also devised
it.
The nature of the system is also important to the problem of
merger. The more random the system, the more inexhaustible the
possibilities. A system of composition based on thousands of coin
flips could produce so many distinct pieces of music that granting
copyright to one would do nothing to preempt the system. A system
of composition based on the sequence of prime numbers, however
random the result might sound, may have only one possible
outcome. If this method of composing were treated as a system,
rather than as a kind of expression, merger would prevent any
copyright in the product of the method.
2. Competing Claims
Even if the public benefits model of copyright suggests that the
work is more important than the creator, copyrights are still
awarded to people. Accordingly, one must ensure that the right
person receives credit as the "author" of an indeterminate work. In
some cases-like that of Artist C, assuming the system is his own
creation-there is only one person who could claim to be the author
376. See Rosen, supra note 342, at 804. Rosen referred to a programmer/artist who
programs computers to produce drawings, claiming that
[a]lthough the machines make decisions on their own, those decisions are made
within confines established by the programmer/artist. A programmer who
wanted different types of pictures would provide different rules of drawing to his
computer. Thus, while it is true that [the programmer), unlike a photographer,
does not anticipate the precise appearance of the final product, he contributes
that without which the endproduct would not exist at all.
Id.
377. In Southco Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit
drew a sharp distinction between the numbering system and the numbers themselves. See id.
at 151. Yet, if there is creativity in the system, perhaps creativity of a purely aesthetic nature,
it is oversimplifying to hold that the product of the system lacks creativity simply because it
is inevitable once the system has been devised.
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of the work, because one person is solely responsible for the
existence of the work. But in the case of my ersatz-Mozart minuet,
various people might claim credit for the work: me, the creator of
the website, the programmer of the computer, or Mozart himself, as
the author of the system. Had I composed my piece by traditional
methods, even based on preexisting materials by Mozart, I could
rely on the correspondence between the form of the work and my
mental conception as the link that establishes me as the "author" of
the piece. Here, however, I had no preconceived conception of the
work, and my only affirmative contribution toward its creation was
the rather trivial act of clicking on a button in order to set the
software in motion. This, I admit, is a difficult problem, though I do
not concede that the solution is necessarily to deny that there is any
author or any copyrightable work. In cases with multiple claimants,
it may be appropriate to identify as the author of the work the
person who is a proximate cause of the work's existence and whose
reward of copyright is most consistent with the constitutional goal
of advancing the arts.378 If it takes many clicks to generate a
Musikalisches Wiurfelspiel composition of unusual merit, it would
not be unreasonable or inconsistent with the constitutional goal of
copyright to treat the clicker as the "author," or at least a "coauthor"
of the composition.
378. When person A conceives of a work but person B puts it into tangible form, taking
direction entirely from A, it is sensible to think of A as the "author" of the work-a position
supported by § 101 of the Copyright Act, which refers to a "fixed" work in a tangible medium
of expression "by or under the authority of the author." 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Adrien v. S. Ocean
Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1991). According to the court in
Adrien:
Poets, essayists, novelists, and the like may have copyrights even if they do not
run the printing presses or process the photographic plates necessary to fix the
writings into book form. These writers are entitled to copyright protection even
if they do not perform with their own hands the mechanical tasks of putting the
material into the form distributed to the public.
Id. Exclusive rights give person A, the most important contributor to the work, an incentive
to undertake such creative efforts. From this, one could conclude that communication of
thought, as opposed to mechanical creation, is the hallmark of authorship, and perhaps, in
this situation, it is. See VerSteeg, supra note 339, at 1365 ("To ascertain whether someone is
an author, we must ask whether he has communicated original expression, either directly
(through personal fixation) or indirectly (through authorizing another to fix it). That is what
makes someone a copyright author. Without communication, a person cannot be an author.").
When the issue is not one of choosing between rival claimants but of determining whether an
indeterminate work has any author, it is far more problematic to rely on communication, at
least if we remain faithful to the instrumentalist model of copyright.
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3. Other Issues
Even if indeterminate works are "original," courts should not lose
sight of other issues that could make indeterminate works
inappropriate for copyright in particular cases. Some works are
indeterminate not for any aesthetic reason but because the
utilitarian function of the work is fulfilled by an arbitrary plan. This
is the case, for example, with random codes or catalog numbers.
Copyright cannot prevent the use of a practical system379 nor,
perhaps, should it entrench a competitive advantage that has
nothing to do with the work per se. If parts numbers of any kind are
copyrightable, and if competitors can compete only by making
reference to the parts numbers used by the market leader, such
reference should be considered a "fair use."' Otherwise, the
legitimate monopoly conferred by the copyright could have an
unintended impact on competition in markets other than that for
the copyrighted work. On the other hand, these concerns are really
no different for indeterminate works than for works produced by
more traditional means. A parts numbering scheme that "means
something" raises the same issues as a random scheme. In either
case, copyright in "the work" should not monopolize the facts,
preempt the system, or hobble competition in unintended ways.
CONCLUSION
In a recent article, Professor David Nimmer considered the
potential copyright interest of contemporary scholars in the
reconstructed text of the Dead Sea Scrolls.381 Although the scholars
did not write the ancient text, they claim that their version is
original, in a sense, because of the many educated guesses that the
fallible process of reconstruction necessitates. Professor Nimmer
rejects that claim, because those guesses are on the "objective plane"
rather than the "subjective plane" which is the stuff of authorship. 82
379. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 102-05 (1879) (holding that a
copyright on a book describing a practical system of accounting conveys no exclusive rights
to the system; such rights can be secured, if at all, only by patent).
380. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
381. See Nimmer, supra note 17.
382. See id. at 22.
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In other words, the scholars are offering judgments about
preexisting facts, which they did not create and cannot own. In that
conclusion I wholeheartedly concur. 3 However, Professor Nimmer
and I may part company when it comes to identifying "intent to
imbue subjective expression into the mix"3"-a standard which
disqualifies randomly generated works-as the key to authorship.
Romantic authorship, natural rights, and personality interests
match well with that emphasis on the interior workings of the
creator's imagination, but the public benefits model of copyright,
which is supposed to predominate, stubbornly refuses to fall in line.
As far as the public interest is concerned, randomly-generated Bingo
cards-which Professor Nimmer gives as an example of an
"unoriginal," because unintended, creation-are neither more nor
less worthy of incentives than identical cards produced by
intentional, subjective, and imaginative means.38
Perhaps no theory of authorship can account for everything, or be
consistent with all that courts have said or lawmakers intended.
Few would-be authors would be denied their copyright simply
because a modicum of intellectual engagement is required. On the
other hand, copyright application should be as consistent with
copyright theory as it can be. I suggest, therefore, that courts keep
an eye on the stated policies of copyright, and an open mind about
the random muse.
383. See Durham, supra note 21, at 83942.
384. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 208.
385. Professor Nimmer does propose that an artist could "adopt" a random pile of garbage
and thereby make it a copyrightable expression, "because of the magical infusion of intent."
Id. Perhaps he would accept my suggestions so long as the "creative control" factor is
maintained.
642 [Vol. 44:569
